

TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW

*For a full list of this Series see the end
of this Book*

JANUS:
THE CONQUEST OF WAR
A Psychological Inquiry

BY

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FOREWORD

In the year 1914 two men, the one a Frenchman, the other a German, met face to face. Both were highly educated sensitive men, cultivated citizens of the world. Both carried arms. The Frenchman had the better luck and plunged his bayonet into the belly of the German. The German stood erect and, holding in both hands his bleeding bowels as they gushed out through the gaping wound, said in excellent French, "See what you have done to me." The French soldier, who related this incident to me shortly after its occurrence, expected to bear with him to the grave the horror and remorse of that moment. It is unlikely that he long survived his victim, and perhaps he would not have desired to do so. Let the reader as he turns these pages, especially if he be an American citizen, lapped in comfort and security such as no other people has ever known, bear in mind the image of this encounter. Let him try to imagine it repeated a million times, and he will have some faint and inadequate conception of the horrors of war.

THE CONQUEST OF WAR

On a lovely morning in the year 1915, I walk through a lane rich with the touching beauties of an English spring. I approach a sombre grey stone building. Its windows are heavily barred. I can almost see upon its front the words, "Abandon hope all ye who enter here." I am admitted and the heavy door is locked behind me. I pass through to a yard surrounded by high walls. In this yard saunters a crowd of men of many nationalities, clothed in strange garments; some are cripples, some are bound about with bandages, and all are mad, made mad by war. They mumble, gibber, grimace; some approach with menacing cries and gestures, but are kept at a distance by stern men in uniform. The imagination of Dante never depicted a more grotesque and horrible inferno than this; yet above us are the tender blue sky and fleecy cloudlets of the English spring. I return to the building and enter a neat closely barred room where three men, in the uniforms of officers of three European armies, stand to attention; all three are defiant, sullen, sad and outwardly respectful, and all are mad. One has a petition to make. He is a German aristocrat from East Prussia, but he can hardly utter his native speech. A shrapnel-bullet has carried away a piece of his skull and a small piece of his brain ;

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and every day he suffers terrible convulsions, each of which takes away a little more of what intellect and self-control are left to him. With difficulty I make out, as I watch his struggling lips, and the beads of anguish on his pale face, his pitiful petition. It is that somehow we shall make known to his wife and four children, waiting and longing with hope deferred on the far Prussian plain, that he still lives.

Before daybreak on a February morning, the gloom of which is deepened by the booming guns and the fitful gleaming of starshells along the line of the trenches, I enter an improvised hospital bearing one end of a stretcher. On it lies a handsome stalwart young Frenchman from the sunny south. We lay the stretcher among many others on the muddy floor. Our man murmurs without ceasing. Again and again I catch the words, "Marie, je t'adore." He is talking to his sweetheart, far away in the south of France. A beautiful French girl falls on her knees beside him. She holds his hand, whispering words of encouragement; she kisses his brow; but he pays no heed and murmurs on. The case is urgent and soon we carry him into a narrow little room and lay him on the operating table. Two surgeons, stern and silent, begin to work upon him. His feet and legs as far as the knees

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are merely masses of torn flesh and broken bits of bone. A terrible mess for the surgeons to clean up. But before they can finish their job, life gives up the painful struggle and goes out of the strong frame. Marie's adoring lover has passed away.

In a hospital ward lies a big fierce gentle Irishman in the prime of his vigorous manhood. He has been the trusted leader of a troop of bombers, all Irishmen from his own small town. He had led them in many a fierce fight, exalting in their prowess. "They were great boys." He repeats it over and over again. But at last he had led them into a trap, from which he alone escaped, unscathed in body. But his mind is deeply scarred. All day he lies upon his bed, seeing upon the ceiling scene after scene of the fierce contest. Every morning at daybreak he rises to bathe himself religiously; for he feels that the sins of all those comrades, hurled to death without absolution, are upon him. He will not go home on furlough, for everyone will ask him, "Where are the boys who went with you?" And he has recently married a young girl, and if he goes home and has to leave her again, "Mary's heart will break." So every day he begs me in his soft Irish accents to send him back to the front, that he may finish his work.

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A young man of stalwart build stands before me, haggard and emaciated, his legs trembling violently with a tremor which he has tried in vain to control during the many weeks since he was sent down from the front. Before the war he was an industrious artisan, happily married, steady, earnest, patriotic, religious. The war has made him a killer of men. He had enlisted voluntarily, and for two years he has fought fiercely; of those who enlisted with him few survive, and the officer to whom he had become devoted has fallen by his side. He begs me to send him back to the fighting front, in order that he may kill more Germans, and so bring nearer the day of their defeat. He has one other consuming desire that has become a fixed resolution. He has learnt that, during his absence at the front while he risked his life every day and endured the utmost horrors of modern war, men who called themselves his friends have debauched his young wife; and he is determined to kill them as soon as he shall be released from military service. Patient inquiry at length discovers a more deeply hidden secret. During an advance on an enemy position, in wild excitement and exasperated by seeing his beloved captain fall shattered beside him, he had leapt into an enemy trench, and found crouching there three wounded

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Germans. He had rushed upon them and, in spite of their cries for mercy, he had thrust his bayonet through each of them. Now, after many months, he still sees their faces wild with terror and hears their piteous last cries. That sound, he says, will never leave him; it breaks through the stillness of the night and wakes him from his short and fevered sleep.

Multiply these scenes and these figures a millionfold, add the tears and terrors of a hundred million women and children, and you still have an inadequate picture of the Great War. No wonder that multitudes have exclaimed, "It shall not be again. War *must* cease!" No wonder that the voice of the militarist is stilled, and even professional soldiers are crying aloud for the abolition of war. The masses of the people in all countries demand peace: a multitude of organizations all the world over are preaching peace, discussing how to prevent war, offering peace-prizes, denouncing war, devising world-wide organizations to render war impossible. Yet the next great war draws nearer, and the most famous living pacifist at the head of a Socialist government, representing the labouring masses of a Great Empire, finds himself driven to build new warships, to plan a great development of the air forces, and to refuse to cut down the Army.

CHAPTER I

LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR

"Universal Peace is a dream and not even a beautiful dream." In these words the German philosopher Treitsche expressed concisely an opinion which during the nineteenth century and up to the outbreak of the Great War, was widely held. Those who proclaimed the necessity and the virtue of war, asserted that war is the great antiseptic of national life, that the need for self-defence is a bracing tonic influence without which nations must become relaxed in moral tone, their populations given over to the pursuit of comfort, luxury, and pleasure, both physical and mental. They argued therefore that assured and long-continued peace between nations must bring about universal decay of morals and of manners. It was argued further that war was the great instrument of natural selection among States and Nations; that, just as the progressive evolution of higher types of organisms has been due to the harsh struggle for existence between individual organisms, so the further evolution of national organisms or States

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can be effected only by a similar struggle for existence between them, a struggle in which war must continue to be an essential factor, the indispensable arbitrament, the fierce crucible in which alone the virtue, the moral fibre of nations, their fitness to survive, must be proved.

Pacifists have usually brushed aside these arguments as unworthy of a moment's consideration. It is wiser to admit that they have a certain force, that they contain an element of truth. William James had this wisdom when in a famous essay he showed that, if war is to be abolished, we shall need "A Moral Equivalent for War". Let us admit that in bygone ages war may have served as an instrument of progress; that, perhaps, the subjugation and partial substitution through war of one people by another has in some cases made for the evolution of human qualities and the progress of civilization; that the Anglo-Saxons were, perhaps, better men than the Britons whom they conquered and partially destroyed; that the Spaniards were better men than the Indians of Mexico and Peru; that the Pilgrim Fathers and the settlers of Virginia were more capable than the Red men of developing a great civilization in the area of the earth best adapted by climate and natural resources to be the headquarters

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of Western civilization. Let us also recognize unreservedly the moral truth which Theodore Roosevelt repeatedly preached to the American nation. "A just war is in the long run far better for a nation's soul than the most prosperous peace obtained by acquiescence in wrong or in injustice." Admitting all this, admitting also the tonic influence of the need for national self-defence, we must recognize, nevertheless, that even before the Great War the argument against war was already strong, the need for its restriction or abolition already urgent. Countless writers have bemoaned the economic burdens imposed by preparations for war and the still greater economic penalties of war itself; and some, like Mr. Norman Angell, had laboured with some success to show that, in the modern world, war can never again be profitable even to the victors. Others, more far-seeing, had insisted upon the destructive effect of war upon the qualities of the human race. In the good old days when the victor slew the conquered males and led to his tent the women of the vanquished host, war may have done something to improve the qualities of the conquered populations. But, even then, such ruthless assertion of the rights of the conqueror may more generally have led in the long run to the degradation of the conquering race by immixture of the blood of the

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conquered; as when the Hindu conquerors, in spite of their elaboration of the caste system, gradually absorbed the blood of the Dravidians and other negroid aborigines of India; or as when the Arabs, mating freely with multitudinous converts made by the force of their arms, sowed the seeds of rapid decay in their brilliant civilization. And in the modern period, as has often been pointed out, the biological effects of war are less equivocal; they are wholly and disastrously harmful to the race; for the burden of military service falls upon the strongest males, forcing them to postpone marriage; while in war itself the fittest to survive and to propagate the race, the flower of the the young manhood of the warring nations, are destroyed, leaving the world forever poorer because deprived, not merely of the contributions to art and science and social betterment which they would have made, but also of its greatest and irreplaceable treasures, the strains of vigorous quality of mind and heart cut off forever in the mud and blood and agony of the fields of War.

If the arguments against war, the economic, the biological, the humanitarian arguments, were already very strong in the opening years of the twentieth century, the recent developments of the art of war, forced and illustrated on a vast scale in the years 1914-1918, have

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rendered them infinitely stronger. Until August 4th, 1914, the world believed that the extreme horrors of the warfare of earlier ages were abolished for ever ; that war henceforth would remain a scientific duel between highly disciplined troops, in which, no doubt, many strong young men might have to endure some hardships and sufferings and even death, but sufferings greatly mitigated by efficient medical services and the world-wide efforts of the Red Cross societies. The developments of the arts of destruction, combined with the ruthless disregard of all the conventions of war initiated by the Germans, and then reluctantly accepted by their adversaries under the pressure of necessity, these developments have shown that this picture of modern war, as a fierce yet chivalrous game under strict rules that would confine its horrors to the battlefields, was but a pleasing dream. These developments, and especially the development of aircraft, of the explosive bomb and of the poison gases, have made it only too clear that in the next Great War the civilian populations, and especially the populations of the great cities, will be the first and greatest sufferers, that wounds, mutilation and death, terror and famine, will be broadcast among them with awful impartiality ; that no woman, no family, no little child, no church, no treasury of art, no museum

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of priceless antiquities, no shrine of learning and science will be immune; but that in a few days or hours great cities may be levelled with the dust, while their surviving inhabitants scrape for crusts amid mangled bodies of fair women and the ruins of the monuments of art and science. In the light of this experience, all the civilized peoples, all intelligent men and women in all countries, are agreed that war must if possible be prevented, that the prevention of war has become the most urgent need of our common civilization, the prime concern of statesmen and of the common people, the indispensable condition of all human welfare and of all that contributes towards it.

The horrors of the Great War, the vast sum of human suffering caused by it; the immense destruction of the flower of our manhood; the terrors and hardships and sorrows imposed upon hundreds of millions of civilians; the enormous economic destruction, recovery from which is now seen to require the labours and the sacrifices of several generations, the almost total lack of the redeeming features of some earlier wars; all these have combined to convince mankind that modern war has become an unmitigated horror to be avoided at well-nigh any cost. This then is one, perhaps the only, good result of the

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Great War, namely, a well-nigh universal Will to Peace.

This dominant Will to Peace, rooted both in the strongest emotional reactions against the horrors of war and in the calmest and most rational calculations of economists and statesmen, has generated and is maintaining a vast amount of public discussion, of writing and lecturing, has brought into existence many associations for the prevention of war, and has stimulated many others into renewed and greater activity. Yet we are told by those who are in the best position to form an opinion, and indeed the fact is only too obvious to all of us, that war clouds are gathering darkly over Europe, and that civilization itself is threatened as never before with destruction by war, a war which, if it shall break out, will far surpass in horror and suffering and destructiveness even the Great War of 1914-1918.¹

¹ This paragraph was written towards the end of 1924. Since that date the outlook has improved in some degree. The understandings reached at Locarno, the entrance of Germany into the League of Nations, the international industrial agreements recently set in train, the diminution of tension between France and Great Britain, all these are changes for the better. But it would be foolish to allow these recent improvements of the international situation to blind us to the fundamental truth, developed in the following chapter; namely, that hitherto we have no guarantee against

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Throughout the nineteenth century, many proposals were made for the mitigation and the abolition of war; and, as the burden of armaments increased and as it was found that the increasing intercourse of nations and the spread of education and of popular government, far from rendering war a more remote possibility, as had been so confidently anticipated, were producing a tremendous growth and spread of the nationalist spirit, were rendering war more imminent and more terrible, and were magnifying the economic burdens of national defence in time of peace, many attempts were made to substitute arbitration for war and to lighten the burden of preparation for war by international agreements for the limitation of armaments. I shall not delay to review these attempts. Those of the former kind, the arbitration agreements, achieved some measure of success. The latter, in spite of their very modest nature (proposals for naval holidays, for the restriction of the size and number of battleships, and of the calibre of guns, for reduction of armies by so much per cent., for the proportioning of armies to the numbers of the population of each country), all these and a hundred other similar proposals, made in some cases by sudden national aggression and that such guarantee is the prime need of the world at the present time.

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statesmen controlling the affairs of the most powerful nations, all these achieved no appreciable alleviation of the burden under which all agreed that the peoples of Europe were groaning. The vast conflagration of 1914 should have made clear to all the world that such partial and timid steps towards the prevention of war and the amelioration of peace were almost wholly futile then ; and the present efforts along similar lines appear as the ridiculous and puny gestures of a civilization impotent to arrest its suicidal course. For the outbreak of the Great War showed that the efforts of sincere and democratic statesmen, the vows of serried masses of socialists, the intimate economic relations of industrial nations, the votes of fully enfranchized democracies, the prayers of the Churches, the education of the masses, the softening of manners, the internationalization of culture, all these great and good influences of the modern world, were as unavailing as the arbitration treaties and the Hague conferences to prevent or long to postpone the dreaded outbreak. The Great War showed us also the futility of another form of international agreement. The leading nations of the world had maintained by mutual consent the agreeable fiction that there existed a body of international law governing their relations and their conduct towards one another ; and they

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had for many years subscribed to certain conventions made at Geneva and the Hague, conventions designed to mitigate the horrors of war, to proscribe the more horrible practices of earlier ages, and to protect the lives and property and liberties of civilian populations. But the Germans were out for *Weltherrschaft oder Niedergang*; and a hundred years of intensive education of all classes had made the mass of the people capable of seeing that it would be folly to let any weak scruples about inflicting a little extra suffering or about the breaking of international conventions prevent them from asserting their moral and intellectual superiority over all other peoples and from bringing the blessings of *Kultur* to all the world. In any case the so-called international laws would not and could not be enforced; for there was no effective sanction behind them, no organized power to prevent or punish the breach of them. The conventions of Geneva and of the Hague were merely polite gestures, harmless amenities of peace time; and to risk defeat through the observance of them would have been a crime against *Kultur*.

And so international laws and conventions for the regulation of war were shown to be utterly futile unless backed by organized power and organized will to use that power.

Before proceeding to develop the

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argument let me re-enforce what has been said in this chapter by citing the words of a statesman whose abilities and intimate knowledge of the conduct of war and peace must give to his utterances an unrivalled authority. Mr. Winston Churchill, half American, half English by parentage, has served with distinction both as soldier and war-correspondent. He was First Lord of the British Admiralty when the Great War broke out; he has been Minister of Munitions, Secretary of State for War and Secretary of State for Air, and now is Chancellor of the Exchequer. In a recent article from his pen, entitled "Shall we Commit Suicide?", occur the following passages.¹

After briefly reviewing the peculiar horrors of modern warfare as illustrated by the Great War, Mr. Churchill wrote as follows:—

"WHAT WAR IN 1919 WOULD HAVE
MEANT"

"But all that happened in the four years of the Great War was only a prelude to what was preparing for the fifth year. The campaign of the year 1919 would have witnessed an immense accession

¹ The article was published in Nash's *Pall Mall Magazine*, September, 1924, i.e. at a time when the League of Nations had been at work for several years, and was a plea for the support of the League.

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to the power of destruction. Had the Germans retained the *moral* to make good their retreat to the Rhine, they would have been assaulted in the summer of 1919 with forces and by methods incomparably more prodigious than any yet employed. Thousands of aeroplanes would have shattered their cities. Scores of thousands of cannon would have blasted their front. Arrangements were being made to carry simultaneously a quarter of a million men, together with all their requirements, continuously forward across country in mechanical vehicles moving ten or fifteen miles each day. Poison gases of incredible malignity, against which only a secret mask (which the Germans could not obtain in time) was proof, would have stifled all resistance and paralyzed all life on the hostile front subjected to attack. No doubt the Germans too had their plans. But the hour of wrath had passed, the signal of relief was given, and the horrors of 1919 remain buried in the archives of the great antagonists.

"The War stopped as suddenly and as universally as it had begun. The world lifted its head, surveyed the scene of ruin, and victors and vanquished alike drew breath. In a hundred laboratories, in a thousand arsenals, factories, and bureaus, men pulled themselves up with a jerk, turned from the task in which they had

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been absorbed. Their projects were put aside unfinished, unexecuted; but their knowledge was preserved; their data, calculations, and discoveries were hastily bundled together and docketed 'for future reference' by the War Offices in every country. The campaign of 1919 was never fought; but its ideas go marching along. In every Army they are being explored, elaborated, refined under the surface of peace, and should war come again to the world it is not with the weapons and agencies prepared for 1919 that it will be fought, but with developments and extensions of these which will be incomparably more formidable and fatal. . . .

"Certain sombre facts emerge solid, inexorable, like the shapes of mountains from drifting mist. It is established that henceforward whole populations will take part in war, all doing their utmost, all subjected to the fury of the enemy. It is established that nations who believe their life is at stake will not be restrained from using any means to secure their existence. *It is probable—nay, certain—that among the means which will next time be at their disposal will be agencies and processes of destruction wholesale, unlimited, and, perhaps, once launched, uncontrollable.*

"Mankind has never been in this position before. Without having improved

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appreciably in virtue or enjoying wiser guidance, it has got into its hands for the first time the tools by which it can unfailingly accomplish its own extermination. That is the point in human destinies to which all the glories and toils of men have at last led them. They would do well to pause and ponder upon their new responsibilities. Death stands at attention, obedient, expectant, ready to serve, ready to shear away the peoples *en masse* ; ready, if called on, to pulverize, without hope of repair, what is left of civilization. He awaits only the word of command. He awaits it from a frail, bewildered being, long his victim, now—for one occasion only—his Master.

“ THE NEW CRISIS

“ Let it not be thought for a moment that the danger of another explosion in Europe is passed. For the time being the stupor and the collapse which followed the World War ensured a sullen passivity, and the horror of war, its carnage and its tyrannies, have sunk into the soul, have dominated the mind of every class and in every race. But the causes of war have been in no way removed ; indeed they are in some respects aggravated by the so-called Peace Treaty and the reactions following thereupon. Two mighty branches of the European family will never rest content with their existing situation.

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Russia, stripped of her Baltic Provinces, will, as the years pass by, brood incessantly upon the wars of Peter the Great. From one end of Germany to the other an intense hatred of France unites the whole population. This passion is fanned continuously by the action of the French Government. The enormous contingents of German youth growing to military manhood year by year are inspired by the fiercest sentiments, and the soul of Germany smoulders with dreams of a War of Liberation or Revenge. These ideas are restrained at the present moment only by physical impotence. France is armed to the teeth. Germany has been to a great extent disarmed and her military system broken up. The French hope to preserve this situation by their technical military apparatus, by their black troops, and by a system of alliances with the smaller States of Europe; and for the present at any rate overwhelming force is on their side. But physical force alone, unsustained by world opinion, affords no durable foundation for security. Germany is a far stronger entity than France, and cannot be kept in permanent subjugation. . . .

“Might not a bomb no bigger than an orange be found to possess a secret power to destroy a whole block of buildings—nay, to concentrate the force of a thousand tons of cordite and blast a

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township at a stroke? Could not explosives even of the existing type be guided automatically in flying machines by wireless or other rays, without a human pilot, in ceaseless procession upon a hostile city, arsenal, camp, or dockyard?

"As for Poison Gas and Chemical Warfare in all its forms, only the first chapter has been written of a terrible book. Certainly every one of these new avenues to destruction is being studied on both sides of the Rhine, with all the science and patience of which man is capable. And why should it be supposed that these resources will be limited to Inorganic Chemistry? A study of Disease—of Pestilences methodically prepared and deliberately launched upon man and beast—is certainly being pursued in the laboratories of more than one great country. Blight to destroy crops, Anthrax to slay horses and cattle, Plague to poison not armies only but whole districts—such are the lines along which military science is remorselessly advancing.

"NEW PERILS TO LIBERTY

"It is evident that whereas an equally contested war under such conditions might work the ruin of the world and cause an immeasurable diminution of the human race, the possession by one side of some overwhelming scientific advantage

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would lead to the complete enslavement of the unwary party. Not only are the powers now in the hand of man capable of destroying the life of nations, but for the first time they afford to one group of civilized men the opportunity of reducing their opponents to absolute helplessness.

"In barbarous times superior martial virtues—physical strength, courage, skill, discipline—were required to secure such a supremacy; and in the hard evolution of mankind the best and fittest stocks came to the fore. But no such saving guarantee exists to-day. There is no reason why a base, degenerate, immoral race should not make an enemy far above them in quality the prostrate subject of their caprice or tyranny, simply because they happened to be possessed at a given moment of some new death-dealing or terror-working process and were ruthless in its employment. The liberties of men are no longer to be guarded by their natural qualities, but by their dodges; and superior virtue and valour may fall an easy prey to the latest diabolical tricks. . . . All the hideousness of the Explosive era will continue, and to it will surely be added the gruesome complications of Poison and of Pestilence scientifically applied.

"Such, then, is the peril with which mankind menaces itself. Means of destruction incalculable in their effects, wholesale and frightful in their character, and

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unrelated to any form of human merit : the march of Science unfolding ever more appalling possibilities ; and the fires of hatred burning deep in the hearts of some of the greatest peoples of the world, fanned by continual provocation and unceasing fear and fed by the deepest sense of national wrong or national danger ! On the other hand, there is the blessed respite of exhaustion, offering to the nations a final chance to control their destinies and avert what may well be a general doom. Surely if a sense of self-preservation still exists among men, if the will to live resides not merely in individuals or nations but in humanity as a whole, the prevention of the supreme catastrophe ought to be the paramount object of all endeavour."

Recognizing that we are all pacifists nowadays, it is my purpose to expound in this little book a plan for the prevention of War, which, after much consideration, I believe to be a practicable plan and indeed the only practicable plan. This plan has been very briefly sketched in a former publication.¹ I have no evidence that the proposal has evoked the faintest interest or provoked discussion of it in

¹ Appendix to my *Ethics and Some Modern World Problems*, Putnam's Sons, New York, 1924, and also in an article "Psychology, Disarmament, and Peace" in the *North American Review* for November, 1924.

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any quarter. Nevertheless, I wish to set it forth rather more fully, to modify it in a way to render it more acceptable, to examine the objections and difficulties in its way, and, by examining very briefly the principal alternative proposals now before the public, to justify the claim that it is the only practicable plan.

Before launching out on the argument, let us take notice of the views of certain soldiers which may seem to run counter to the view expressed in this chapter. These soldiers,¹ tell us that, in future, war will be conducted by "mechanized" armies and by air-planes dropping gas-bombs; and, assuming that some gas which will produce a temporary general paralysis or sleep will alone be used, and drawing a veil over the procedures of the army of tanks, they manage to make it seem that in the future war will be once more a great game for gentlemen. They seem to assume that the peoples attacked by their ingeniously designed armies will at once with one consent throw up their hands and cry "Kamerad". I venture to suggest that this is merely one more of those fancy pictures with which we are apt to delude ourselves when we take no account of the nature of man and scornfully ignore psychology.

¹ Notably Col. J. T. C. Fuller, who has been called "the foremost military prophet of the day", and Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart.

CHAPTER II

THE CAUSES OF WAR

The world is sick with a terrible intermittent fever, and we who are living now in one of the periods of intermittence are vastly concerned to find some effective remedy before the next recurrence of the fever; for the next attack may well prove fatal. And, like a sick man surrounded by anxious friends, we hear a multitude of counsellors, prescribing prayers and phylacteries, repentance and good resolutions, pills and plasters, douches hot or cold. But, if the sick man is to choose wisely among the clamours of his counsellors, he must know something of the causes of his disease, must be able to distinguish the underlying causes from mere symptoms and aggravating circumstances.

The parallel goes further and deeper. The sickness of the world is primarily a functional and mental disorder. The individual sufferer from such disorder, even if he seeks the advice of learned doctors, is all too likely to be treated as though his trouble were the effect of material causes. Just so the learned doctors of international disorders belong

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for the most part to the materialistic school; they have learned to accept the economic interpretation of history, to see only economic causes behind the world's disorder, and, forgetting that man does not live by bread alone, to prescribe only economic remedies.

If the individual sufferer turns from such materialistic advice to his spiritual adviser, to the man whose function is the cure of souls, he is too likely to receive only moral exhortation, exhortations that are perfectly futile, because he who gives them does not understand the nature of the disorder and cannot put his finger on the cause. So, also, when the World turns from its economic specialists, weary of their superficial and impracticable prescriptions, to its accepted moral guides, it receives merely moral exhortation and impotent denouncements of its wickedness and wrongdoings.

THE WICKEDNESS OF MAN

Let us dwell a moment on the diagnosis of the spiritual advisers. This is a numerous group which flourishes especially in the United States. It includes many, perhaps most, of the extreme "pacifists" or peace-at-any-price people. They are in the main somewhat naïve and ignorant persons. Firmly convinced of their righteousness and of the good intentions of themselves and their circle of

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like-minded people, they believe that war, like most other evils of the world, is due simply to the wickedness of a large part of mankind. These imaginary wicked people, whom they call variously soldiers, militarists, imperialists, aristocrats, monarchs, or predatory rulers, they conceive to be constituted very differently from themselves, somewhat after the pattern of an ever-hungry wolf of peculiarly vicious disposition that constantly fights from sheer "cussedness". Or they imagine that a large part of their fellow men are thirsting for military glory and the fun and excitement of killing other men, that, in fact, for some large part of the human race war is a highly esteemed sport pursued by these men by reason of their bloodthirsty nature, utterly regardless of the sufferings they may inflict or endure.

These good people remind me of a middle-aged spinster of my acquaintance who seriously believes that all women are born good and all men born bad. They have been taught to divide all mankind into sheep and goats, into the saved and the damned; and they apply this simple philosophy when they discuss the problems of war and peace.

There is a small element of truth in this view. To some primitive peoples war has been a sport; and there still exist a few such tribes (as, for example, the

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Sea Dayaks of Borneo) and a few such men among the civilized nations. But their influence is negligible in the present age. Modern nations do not go to war without believing that they have some more serious reason for it than the sporting reasons, without some other and more powerful motive.

Some of the "pacifists" are rather closer to reality when they assert that certain groups of individuals, more especially armament-makers and certain financial and business groups, make war for the sake of the profiteering they hope to indulge in, or, more vaguely, for the sake of fishing in troubled waters. These (who form a transition to the group of economic interpreters) grossly exaggerate the influence of such persons. It is absurd to suppose that those who desire peace (including as they do the vast majority of the populations, the politicians and the statesmen of the world) can be led willy-nilly to the slaughter by the subterranean influence of these few goats.

This view has lately been elaborated by a man who must command a respectful hearing by reason of his abilities and experience and also because he brings to bear on the problem a psychology rather less crude than that of other exponents of this view; for, as I have implied in the sub-title to this little volume, the problem of war and peace is wholly

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a psychological problem. Mr. Arthur Ponsonby,¹ who has sat many years in the House of Commons and has served as Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, places the responsibility for war on what he calls "Authority". And by "Authority" he means the influence of the holders of official and semi-official positions in the nation, those who, largely by reason of their well-recognized positions, are the main supporters of the customary and traditional attitudes in public affairs, and who in the main lead and form public opinion on all questions concerning the life of the nation. He does not charge these persons with sheer delight in warfare, with a special dose of original sin or anything of that sort. He regards them rather as led into the support of war and of preparations for war, and especially into maintaining and cultivating in the people at large a mental and moral readiness for war, by the momentum of the traditions within which they are brought up, traditions to whose influence they are peculiarly susceptible in virtue of their positions within the hierarchy of officialdom. The influence of traditional ways of thinking and feeling (especially the traditional belief that war must inevitably recur) upon many of these persons is re-enforced by self-interest, as in the case of the soldier whose career is made one

¹ *Now is the Time*, London, 1925.

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of quicker advancement, of more vivid interest and of greater consideration, by wars and rumours of war. Although, then, deliberate self-seeking and malignity may play but a minor part in the whole working of Authority,¹ Mr. Ponsonby charges it with maintaining perennially "The Great Conspiracy", by which he means a more or less concerted effort to keep public opinion tuned up for war, an effort which takes the form of exaltation on all occasions of the military function, its heroism, its glamour, its services to the nation in the past, its indispensability in the future

Allied to the good people who attribute all war to the wickedness of the goats, are those who bring a more general indictment against human nature and find a sufficient explanation of all war in the fact that man is a pugnacious beast, that the human species is endowed with an instinct of pugnacity. They are apt to take a fatalistic line and to assert with resignation that this fact of natural history renders it useless to try to prevent war. Or, if they are less resigned, they join

¹ "No greater mistake," he writes, "can be made than to suppose that international war is caused by the fundamental viciousness of mankind." And again: "I prefer to think that most people admit the terrible nature of war but regard it as a hideous necessity and . . . believe that periodically it is inevitable."

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with the "pacifists" proper in hoping to prevent war by exhortation, by education, by more intensive preaching of the principles of Christianity. Many of them assert that war is due to hate, the hate of one nation for another. These seem commonly to assume that hate springs unbidden in the human breast. They neglect to inquire into the nature and causes of hatred. If they should so inquire, they would find that hatred is always a blend of anger and fear, that both the anger and the fear have their grounds, and that the fear of international hate is *the fear of aggression*.

ARMAMENTS

It is widely asserted that the existence of standing armies and navies is, in the modern age, the main cause of war. It is said that the possession of vast armaments and of great numbers of armed men induces in a nation a desire to use those forces, develops in it a pride of power, a desire for military glory, and the indifference of a well-armed bully to the rights and sensibilities of other nations. And it is further said that the vast mechanism of a modern war-machine, when once it has been set in motion, has a momentum which renders it impossible to arrest its movement before it has shed blood and engendered new floods of hatred.

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There is some truth in these assertions ; but it is clear that the existence of great armed forces is but one of the proximate causes of war. If there were no deeper lying cause, if nations had no grounds for preparing for war, they would not maintain great armed forces. And the existence of each great military machine adds to the danger of the international situation and engenders an exhausting rivalry in armaments and military preparations of all kinds, because and in so far as it excites in other nations *the fear that they, if unarmed, may be made its victims.*

THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION

The economic interpreters of war are a more influential if less numerous group than the good sheep who attribute all war to the goats. Among them are many influential writers, including most of the Socialists and of the falsely named "internationalists", the "internationalists" of the red variety. The latter are all for bloody class-wars; while they denounce all other war as the work of selfish capitalists. Thus they agree with the more sober economic materialists who assert with untroubled dogmatism that "All war is at bottom caused by economic rivalry".

The supporters of this proposition point to the undoubted fact of competition between industrial nations for

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and in the markets of the world, and to measures such as tariffs taken to secure advantages in such competitions. They point to the hunt for "concessions" from the rulers of undeveloped territories, and especially to the rivalry of nations in the search for the raw materials of industry. They make out a stronger case in so far as they bring into the picture the pressure of expanding populations seeking territories in which they may support life with fewer hardships than in their own overcrowded areas.

If we leave aside this last factor, it may safely be asserted that direct economic rivalry alone, though it may cause some international friction, has not been in recent years and is not likely in the future to be a serious factor in provoking war between great nations. As Mr. Norman Angell has shown, no nation in the present or in the future can hope that the economic gains to be made by war against another nation of approximately equal power will balance the enormous losses which war must bring, the vast expenditure on materials of war, the loss of life, the withdrawing of great numbers of workers from economic production, the high probability of destruction of whole cities, the financial disturbance, the suspension of profitable trade. In the war of 1870 the Germans did profit economically by their success in war.

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But since that date many developments have combined to render such profiting impossible or wildly improbable: the increased scale of international relations in finance and trade; the enormous cost of the material equipment for modern war; the greatly increased destructive power of the weapons of offence, especially of the submarine and of aircraft; and the liability to destruction of cities and civilian populations far behind the lines of battle.

But, though economic rivalry is no longer likely to work as a direct cause of war between nations of equal rank, there remains the less serious but hardly less regrettable possibility that powerful nations may be tempted to use their armed power to compel economic concessions from the minor powers. This is the chief source of danger to peace involved in what is called economic imperialism. For, though the threatened small power would, if it stood alone, hardly venture to resist, yet it may find among the larger powers one or more that is willing to espouse its cause on grounds of racial or national affinities and with a view to the maintenance of its own prestige and a share in the desired economic possibilities of the threatened country.

The economic competition, then, in so far as it operates as a cause of war, does

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so in the main by maintaining and intensifying in various States *the fear of armed aggression* by more powerful States.

THE PRESSURE OF POPULATION

The one quasi-economic factor which still may operate as a serious and direct cause of war is the rapid increase of population in certain countries already overcrowded. This factor certainly played an important part in bringing on the war of 1914; though it did not operate strictly as an economic factor. The population of Germany was dense and rapidly increasing. But, thanks to the high industrial organization, and great natural resources, especially of coal and potash, the general standard of life was maintained at a good level. There was no immediate demand for outlet for the increasing population. Emigration had diminished and indeed had been discouraged by the government. Even to Germany's own colonies there was very little emigration. The rapid and steady increase of population acted chiefly by way of encouraging in the masses and in the leaders their consciousness of being a great and powerful nation that had the right and the power to cut a great figure in the world. It was, that is to say, through the stimulation of national

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pride and ambition that the increase of Germany's population made for war.

But, though in this instance increase of population did not operate directly as an economic incentive to war, it can hardly be doubted that it may so operate in the future. Japan illustrates this danger most vividly. When some half century ago Japan, having been forced by naval power to open her gates, began to westernize herself, her population was already dense in proportion to her very restricted area of fertile soil. As in all other countries, the application of the earth's reserve of energy to the development of mechanical power and machine-driven industry led to an increase in the birth-rate; and, at the same time, the adoption of the methods of Western hygiene and medicine produced a fall in the death-rate. Therefore the population has increased rapidly and since, unlike Germany, Japan seems to have no great reserves of coal, oil or other natural resources, the standard of life of the masses remains at a low level. Japan consequently desires to secure outlets for large numbers of emigrants, and casts longing eyes on Australia, California and other areas of temperate climate, fertile soil, and low density of population.

All such areas are already occupied by peoples of European stock; and, though Japanese immigrants, on account

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of their excellent qualities, would be welcome in most of those areas, if their numbers could be safely and surely restricted, the inhabitants of those areas believe that such immigration, if it be not severely restricted, will in the course of a few years bring in very large numbers of Japanese, most of whom will retain not only their Eastern outlook on life, but also their honourable devotion to the interests of the Japanese Empire. They believe therefore on good grounds that unrestricted immigration of Japanese into their area will inevitably lead to internal friction between the racial groups that will remain distinct for an indefinite period, and only too probably to the desire of Japan to intervene in the domestic affairs of their country, a desire which might prompt her to support the cause of her emigrants with armed force.

The case of Japan is only the most urgent and strikingly clear example of a tendency which is growing stronger and affecting an increasing number of countries. Signor Mussolini has voiced similar desires and claims on behalf of Italy. The peoples of British India are beginning to create insoluble problems for the British Commonwealth by their desire to spread freely into Africa, Australia and Canada ; and if India were an independent State of developed military

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resources her pressure towards the open spaces would be a very serious matter. The whole surface of the earth is now mapped out as the territories of the various existing States. And all these areas are being rapidly exploited; their fertile parts tilled, their natural resources worked intensively. Competition for fertile soil and the other natural resources is destined to grow keener, until all peoples shall have learnt to adjust their fecundity to the territories available to them.¹

¹ Professor E. M. East (*Mankind at the Cross-roads*) has recently shown good reason to believe that by the end of the present century the possibilities of further increase of the world's population will be exhausted, or, at least, that further increase will be possible only at the cost of serious detriment to the standard of life of the great masses of the civilized peoples. Many resolute optimists have pooh-poohed this forecast, pointing to the possibilities of raising great herds of reindeer within the Arctic circle, of extending Canada's wheatfields far to the north, and of cultivating more intensively the areas already developed. But though it may be true that the earth can be made to yield a vastly greater mass of food for the human race than hitherto, it seems true that the world is near the point of diminishing returns in this respect. And, if that is the case, further multiplication of population and of food supply means a lowering of the standard of living for the masses of mankind and an increasingly acute competition for the available resources. It is worth noting in this connexion that the Canadian wheatfields have already been extended northwards beyond the climatic zone in which men willingly settle down to make their homes.

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The increase of the populations of various countries is, then, a serious factor making for war. It works in part only as a direct economic incentive to war. It is, in the main, because and in so far as the swelling populations are nationals of powerful States, that this factor operates. For any such State is reluctant to see its emigrants lose their attachment to their mother country. It is under strong temptation to regard them as a means of spreading its own influence, of increasing its strength and prestige as a world-power; in fact to be led into aggressive action against other States on the plea of a maternal interest in the welfare of its emigrants.

The increase of populations tends to maintain armaments and to add to the risks of war *by maintaining and intensifying the fear of aggression.*

THE SPIRIT OF NATIONALITY—PATRIOTISM AND CHAUVINISM—THE WILL TO POWER

Very many writers on War have seen in the fact of nationality and in the spirit of patriotism or devotion to the nation the main causes of war.

There is a certain truth in this view. War is the conflict of politically organized groups.

In past ages when political power was in the hands of monarchs and

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oligarchs, States were often plunged into war by the personal ambitions and rivalries of these politically powerful persons. But in the present age, when all countries are organized and governed more or less democratically, i.e. more or less in accord with the public opinion of their populations, no great State-action and especially no war can be undertaken without the uncoerced support of a large proportion of the population.

Now such popular consent to and support of war or of aggressive policy leading to war is given to governments only in virtue of the spirit of nationality that pervades the people. If in the mass of the people there were no attachment to their own nation, to the national organism with its traditional institutions and government, if the people did not regard themselves as members of a political entity deserving of their attachment or devotion, an entity or organism that plays some beneficent part in their lives, they would hardly support the government in war. If they asked from government only civil order and administration, police and public services, they would recognize that one government is not so much worse than another as to justify the evils and sufferings of warfare for the sake of preventing the substitution of one by another. They would be content to live under any administration that was

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reasonably efficient and not too despotic, But the spirit of nationality is something much more positive and active than a mere acceptance of a government of a particular form, or government by a particular person or group of persons. It is a positive preference for the traditional forms and institutions of one's political group, a preference which is rooted in a very complex system of sentiments, sentiments of love for the land itself, of pride in the past history of the nation, of devotion and gratitude to its institutions and great men, and of aspiration for its future. Such a system of sentiments is what we call patriotism. Patriotism is, like all our loves and devotions, in large measure irrational, that is to say, independent of any possibility of rational demonstration of the superiority of that which we love to other similar objects. And it is the root of a multitude of preferences or prejudices in favour of whatever is native to one's own land as against what is foreign, from table-manners and modes of dress to language, literature, and religion. During the last century or two the spirit of nationality has grown in extent and intensity with constant acceleration. It has been the main shaping force of European history throughout the nineteenth century, and is now become almost world wide; it dominates almost every political State,

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even many in which a few generations ago it was hardly at all manifested ; and in most States it is now a burning passion diffused throughout the mass of the people. Each national group, in so far as it enjoys Statehood, desires strongly to maintain and to strengthen itself as a national State, a self-contained, self-governing political organism ; and, in so far as it has not achieved independent Statehood, it aspires to do so. This state of affairs is in the main the direct consequence of the spread of knowledge and understanding through educational processes among the masses of mankind.

A pure and intense patriotism is entirely compatible with a spirit of goodwill towards and friendly co-operation with other nations. But, unfortunately, like all other strong sentiments of love or devotion, it is very liable to assume in many men a perverted form in which envy and dislike of other nations become as powerful for evil as love of country is powerful for good, that perverted form properly called Chauvinism. And even in the absence of any positive dislike towards other nations, patriotism, like self-love, may become dangerous through excessive development of the will-to-power. Nations, like individuals, love power and glory for their own sakes, quite apart from any economic benefits that may accrue through them ; indeed

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they are willing to make great economic sacrifices in the pursuit of power and glory. And they are touchy in questions of national honour and reputation, ready to resort to armed force as a means of asserting the national honour or of resenting any offence against it. For, in the eyes of the world at large, honour and power go together. The lust for power, which too often goes with patriotism as an ingredient of the spirit of Nationalism, is then a real and serious factor making for war. It plays its part in maintaining great armed forces and, perhaps more than any other one factor, renders nations liable to throw such forces against one another upon slight occasions; and thus *it quickens and keeps constantly vivid in each nation the fear of armed aggression upon its territory.*

FEAR OF ARMED AGGRESSION

We have concisely reviewed all the great latent causes of war, and we have found that all of them, in so far as they are real and potent, conspire to produce in each nation the fear of aggression by other nations. Such fear impels all nations to maintain their armed forces at the greatest possible strength and efficiency, ready to strike at a moment's notice. Under modern conditions this fear is peculiarly great and potent; for

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the rapidity with which great forces can be moved into action, and the immense advantage in modern warfare of a lead of a few days or hours over the enemy in taking action, combine to render every State acutely aware that it may find itself attacked before it has had time to assume the defensive attitude. And the coming of aerial warfare has immensely accentuated both this rapidity and this advantage, and has thus intensified this universal fear of sudden overwhelming aggression.

The fear of sudden overwhelming aggression has thus become a factor through which all other causes of war are magnified, are rendered indefinitely more powerful to provoke war and to impel the nations to make vast expenditure on preparations for war. Towards this fear they all converge; through it they all obtain their leverage, their influence over the masses and the statesmen. It is this fear which renders unavailing all the pleadings of the pacifists, all the moral exhortations against war, all the most wisely directed efforts towards disarmament. It may confidently be said that in the absence of this fear, many, perhaps all, nations would be glad to reduce their armaments to a minimum.

If this fear can be removed, all the other causes of war will be reduced to manageable proportions; reason, good-

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will and good sense will prevail, and the risk of war between civilized nations will become remote. In considering measures proposed for the prevention of war, the fear of aggression must be kept steadily in the centre of the picture. The more directly any proposed measure may tend to allay this fear, the greater its value; the more remote its contribution towards this end, the less likely is it to be effective.

And it is to be noted that in order to allay this fear it is not sufficient to make nations reasonably secure against aggression. In order to render war improbable, it is necessary rather to enable nations to feel secure, to provide security against aggression that shall be as nearly as possible absolute and of such a kind as will appeal to the popular imagination.

Before briefly reviewing the measures proposed for the prevention of war, let me re-enforce what has been said above by citing the statements of some authoritative voices.

In an essay entitled "Utopia or Hell", the late Theodore Roosevelt wrote as follows:—

"I do not for one moment believe that the men who follow Treitschke in his hatred of and contempt for all non-Germans, and Bernhardt in his contempt for international morality, are a majority

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of the German people or even a very large minority. I think that the great majority of the Germans, who approved Germany's action toward Belgium, have been influenced by the feeling that it was a vital necessity in order to save Germany from destruction and subjugation by France and Russia, perhaps assisted by England. Fear of national destruction will prompt men to do almost anything, and *the proper remedy for outsiders to work for is the removal of fear.*¹ If Germany were absolutely freed from the danger of aggression on her eastern and western frontiers, I believe that German public sentiment would refuse to sanction such acts as those against Belgium."

Lord Cecil has made a profound study of the means to prevent war and has proved himself perhaps the most assiduous and effective of all workers for peace. In an address to the Foreign Policy Association,² he is reported to have said :

"There is no use to hope that there is any real security for permanent peace so long as the nations stand on one side or the other of their borders armed to the teeth for aggressive warfare. Everyone agrees to that, not only in this country but practically all over the world. . . . There are still some armament maniacs left among the nations of the world. . . .

¹ Italics mine.

² New York, April, 1923. Italics mine.

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What keeps alive armaments is one thing and one thing only. *It is the fear and suspicion of the nations for one another. That is at the bottom of most of the troubles that afflict our world at the present time. . . . If you get rid of aggression, you get rid of war.*"

I have no doubt that Lord Cecil would accept the following emendation of the last sentence: If you get rid of the fear of aggression, you get rid of that which is by far the most powerful of all influences tending to produce war.

CHAPTER III

PREVENTIVES OF WAR

The measures proposed for the prevention of war and the efforts directed to that end naturally fall into a number of classes or types corresponding to the alleged main causes of war. I propose to examine each type, asking in respect of each three questions: Is it in itself desirable or permissible? Is it practicable? Is it, if permissible and practicable, likely to be effective? Before we can rationally advocate any such measure we must be able to give a very clear affirmative answer to each of these questions as applied to it.

EDUCATION AND EXHORTATION AND THE ENLIGHTENING OF PUBLIC OPINION

Many of those who hold to the theory of the goats, who believe that war is wholly or mainly due to the wickedness of wicked men, would confine preventive efforts to moral education and exhortation. Many of them see, as it is only too easy to see, that such efforts cannot hope to influence profoundly the existing breed of men. But they maintain that, if such

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efforts be steadily and intensively applied to the rising generations, to the children, then we may hope to engender in them so strong a hatred of war that, when they come to manhood, war will cease. As to the mode in which these citizens of the future are to render effective their moral sentiments against war, there seem to be two schools of opinion. According to the more naïve, we must hope to make our moral education so effective and so world-wide that nowhere in the world will any considerable body of people consent to participate in war under any circumstances, under any provocation, in the defence of any rights, for the redress of any wrongs. This is the form of pacificism which good Christians who live narrow and sheltered lives, remote from the seat of probable war, are naturally inclined to advocate. It has a great body of exponents in the United States. For a great part of the inhabitants of that fortunate land, the Great War was little more than a vast national picnic; they condescended to take part in it only because the rest of the world was so mad and bad that something had to be done to bring it to its senses, to arrest the orgy of mutual extermination and give the combatants time to cool down and come to their right minds. And now all that remains to be done, it seems to them, is to bring the rest of the

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world by example and precept to the same state of prosperous contentment as they themselves enjoy. It is this attitude which finds expression in the public declarations of many Americans, among whom are many young men, that under no circumstances will they lift a finger to contribute in any way to the conduct of war.

This attitude of resolute non-participation is often defended by a very simple argument. All use of force in human affairs is wrong ; war is the use of force and therefore is wrong ; I will not countenance or participate in wrong-doing. Such people do not see that they have no right to the advantages of civilization ; that, in enjoying the freedom and protection afforded to all men by a civilized State, they are meanly accepting the benefits only procured and maintained by organized and beneficently directed force, while throwing upon others the responsibility for using that force. Their attitude amounts to this : We will have nothing to do with any human institution that falls short of perfection, we will participate in no activity that is not ideal—let others do the dirty work of the world necessary for our comfort, we will not soil our hands and make ourselves odious with sweat and grime.

It is, perhaps, unnecessary to expound the weaknesses of this position. It may suffice to point out that, at the most

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hopeful estimate, many years, let us optimistically say one hundred years, must elapse before this programme can become effective. In the meantime all higher civilization, including that of the United States, may have been swept away in some world-wide holocaust such as Mr. Winston Churchill has depicted.¹ We may also ask the advocates of this measure to dwell in imagination upon the position of those young men who shall have made this solemn declaration, if and when their country shall have become involved in a life and death struggle; or to consider the position of America if and when a large proportion of her young men, say a large minority of them including many of the educated class, shall have bound themselves in the most solemn way to refuse all co-operation in the defence of their country.

Let them reflect that the civilized part of mankind is still but a small part; that in former ages civilization has been wellnigh overwhelmed and destroyed by hordes of barbarians; that such security as civilization at present enjoys against new waves of barbaric force rests wholly upon its superiority in the arts of war and its readiness to apply those arts; that, but for this superiority, the whole Moslem world, from Morocco to Borneo, would quickly unite its efforts, and, led

¹ p. 23.

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by the Turks, the Afghans, and the Arabs, with religious fervour would trample Christian civilization in dust and blood. Let them remember also that in Russia, in China, in Africa are many millions of men well suited to become the tools of a new Attila, a new Tamerlane, a new Genghis Khan, or a new Napoleon.

We may confidently assert that this all too simple plan is neither desirable nor practicable, nor likely to be effective. Its partial realization on a considerable scale would bring world-chaos ; and from its very nature it is a plan which can at the best only be realized in slow and gradual fashion, and can become effective only after the lapse of a long period.

But Mr. Ponsonby, in the little book mentioned above (p. 36), has made a considered effort to state this policy in a concise and carefully thought-out manner. It seems worth while to examine with care his prescription for the great evil. He expounds at length the futility of insisting on the religious, the humanitarian and the economic arguments against war. Of them he says : " Taken alone, I do not believe they are bringing sufficient converts to the cause of peace."

The pleas of religion, of humanity, of economic self-interest have, he says, proved futile. " So also has the rapier of philosophy and economics. Let us pick up the bludgeon of common sense,

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and as the chief foe is Humbug, it may turn out to be the best weapon." Let us see with what effect he wields this bludgeon. He puts forward in place of the religious, humanitarian and economic pleas, what he calls the rationalist argument, which runs as follows: War and preparations for war are undertaken for the sake of some end; but they never attain the desired end, they prove utterly futile and worse than futile, because they only breed more war; therefore let each of us frankly and finally refuse to take part in any war on any grounds whatsoever.

This teaching seems at first sight to be merely the doctrine of individual passive resistance to war which has had so much vogue in America and on which I have commented in the foregoing section, qualified only by special insistence on the impossibility of economic or material gain through war, a doctrine so long and so ably propounded by Mr. Norman Angell.

But Mr. Ponsonby, as we have seen, repudiates the view that war is due simply to the wickedness of wicked men; he has put forward a peculiar view of the causes of war and properly seeks to adjust his remedy to his view of the causes. The cause is the influence of "Authority", and the problem is to break or counteract this influence. "It is Authority itself which must be tackled." "Authority," the reader will remember,

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is constituted by the system of official, semi-official and traditionally recognized positions of power and influence, occupied by persons who make up the greater part of what are called the educated classes. The rest of the nation (according to Mr. Ponsonby's philosophy) is made of two parts, the Government and the mass of the people; and the problem is to break the power of "Authority" over the mass of the people, so that it may no longer persuade them to accept the delusions that by war some desirable end may be achieved and that preparations for war are worth while.

Now Mr. Ponsonby well knows the great power of Authority; knows that it plays the chief part in shaping public opinion; he knows therefore that, when it begins to be made known that "the causes declared by the Government for the declaration of any war are, and must be, based on lies, and that war, however fiercely waged and however successfully terminated, can accomplish nothing at all, . . . Authority will foresee the coming danger of the people's awakening long before it reaches this point [the effective point] and accordingly it will in good time lay its plans to obviate so embarrassing a dilemma. Considering its nature and its methods, considering its peculiar and unseen power, in all probability Authority will succeed so that the people will be

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prevented from reaching this degree of enlightenment.”¹

Although, then, we have been told that “Education must be the lever” and that “there is only one thing which can crush militarism, it is the spread of education and democracy in an era of peace”, we cannot hope, as Mr. Ponsonby explicitly recognizes, to break the power of Authority by enlightening the people. There remains only the Government; to it we must pin our hopes. “Although a Government is only part of Authority and acts traditionally as its servant, it is by no means impossible for a Government to become master of Authority and establish a new tradition.” A Government, then, resolutely determined to refuse to go to war or to prepare for war could maintain this attitude by mastering and radically transforming Authority. “The social ideals of such government would be as subversive of the accepted traditions as would be their international ideals. The whole official engine would have to be turned in a new direction and provided the Government were convinced and determined, they would be in a position to do this.” But, of course, as Mr. Ponsonby is at pains to point out (ruefully remembering the record of the Government of which he was a member), it must be a Government enjoying the secure support of a large

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 167.

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parliamentary majority. How then is such an enlightened Government to be secured and given strong parliamentary support? Mr. Ponsonby nowhere tells us. He does tell us that "Anyone attending debates on foreign policy will appreciate the fact that the underlying foundation generally accepted as a matter of course is the continued existence of war. They will at once realize that it cannot be from parliaments and Governments that the great change, the new voice, and the new appeal are as yet to be expected. . . . It is not by gesticulating before the very guardians of the old tradition that the change desired can best be brought about, but rather by reaching the people first, enlightening them, and preventing them in good time from being taken in by the hackneyed phrases which have been their undoing in the past." Thus Mr. Ponsonby completes his vicious circle, round which he runs like a squirrel in a cage. The people must be enlightened; but that can only be done when the power of Authority shall have been broken or completely changed in character; that, in turn, can only be effected by a strong Government determined to accomplish this tremendous task; and such a Government can only be put in power by the mass of the people already enlightened. Further, this impossibly circular task must be accomplished

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within the next few years, while the horrors of war are still present to the memories of the people.

It may seem otiose further to examine Mr. Ponsonby's argument. But, since just such loose thinking is to my mind the main obstacle to peace, I am anxious to deal thoroughly with this prominent example of it provided by an ex-Minister of State.

It is an essential part of Mr. Ponsonby's premises that war is and must be in all cases and circumstances futile. He aims to prove this by enumerating all the objects or purposes with which war may be waged. He distributes them under twelve heads, and seeks to prove this contention for each of them. We need deal only with the first, namely, "War as a defence against aggression." In three short pages he professes to show that war and preparations for war directed against aggression are futile. The demonstration consists in asserting that international jurists have found it impossible to define aggression, and that "to discover proof of aggression is not possible, as the jurists have now admitted." The implied conclusion is—therefore there is and can be no aggression. It is a purely verbal quibble unworthy of a serious argument. He touches vaguely upon the form of aggression in the prevention of which the British Empire is

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most vitally interested, namely, interference with sea-borne commerce; and he dismisses this most vital danger in three lines: "But the world's waterways should be the property of all the world. Any danger would then be removed."

But it is clear that Mr. Ponsonby himself is not satisfied with this trivial treatment of a great problem. For his next chapter is entitled "Security", and deals with the problem of national security. "The most reasonable and necessary ambition for any nation to entertain is that of security. Without security, so long as there is fear and apprehension of future war, no nation can settle down to the better development of its own national life, nor can it embark freely on international intercourse with any confidence. The desirability of this aim . . . is therefore beyond dispute." He then points out at some length the obvious truth that in this problem of security all nations are involved in a vicious circle. "We armed because we feared them, they armed because they feared us. . . . *Security for all is, therefore, the only great objective.* . . . Security means the absence of war, and this comprehends the whole subject."¹ How then are we to secure that security for all nations which is the main

¹ Italics mine.

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desideratum, the crux of the whole problem of war and peace?

Mr. Ponsonby's reply is—By general disarmament. "Disarmament, therefore, should become the first aim and object of the pacifist. Not, as some say, security first, then disarmament. This means you will get neither. But disarmament first, and security must follow, and indeed can only follow on disarmament."

Now it is clear to Mr. Ponsonby, as it is not apparently to a great many persons, that a mere reduction of armaments would not provide security. "Half-way houses in this case are extremely precarious. It is much more difficult to insist on and supervise limitation in armaments than to decide on disarmament." Further, it is clear to him that, in spite of his demonstration that aggression is a fiction of the imagination and cannot occur (because, as he says, the jurists cannot define it and cannot discover proof of its occurrence), no great nation will consent to disarm itself completely as an example to others. He even goes so far as to tell us that he would not in the present state of affairs urge the disarmament of his own country. "Personally I would neither vote for, nor advocate, the abolition of the standing Army and the scrapping of the Navy. Public opinion is not ripe for such a step." In short: "No one nation will dare to

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take the initiative ; there must be simultaneous action." All nations or all the great nations must simultaneously disarm themselves. "Disarmament must come by mutual agreement." Consequently we are thrown back again upon the educative process which, as we have seen, is frustrated by Authority, which in turn can only be overcome by a strong Government placed in power by the educated enlightened mass of the people.

The prospect of general disarmament is then not very near. As Mr. Ponsonby himself says : "From the point of view of foreign opinion, therefore, prospects are not bright." From which verdict one can dissent only in so far as it seems to imply that the prospect of British disarmament is bright.

I shall have a few words to say upon the general problem of disarmament in a later chapter. Here it may suffice to point out that Mr. Ponsonby never escapes from his squirrel's cage. He is a Socialist ; and at the back of his mind seems to lie the hope that some day all Governments will be in the hands of Socialists ; and that then, because Socialists are good and wise men, all nations will simultaneously disarm. But he wisely refrains from making prominent this feature of his reflections ; for obviously, if security can only come when all nations

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shall have been converted to Socialism, we have a long row to hoe, and civilization may well have destroyed itself before we shall have made appreciable progress in that direction.

The reader may suspect that I am treating Mr. Ponsonby unfairly. I beg to assure him that it is not so. We have the spectacle of a good man with abilities that have made him a Minister of State and with experience as Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in a British Government, honestly and futilely struggling to devise a procedure through which education and exhortation may produce throughout the world enough of enlightenment and goodwill to abolish war. He does not, like so many aggressive Socialists, say—This is the social state we desire, therefore human nature is such as will lend itself to the realization of our plan. He does not, like Mr. Wells, invoke a magical gas from the tail of a comet to transform us into animals so happily constituted that we shall be glad to share with one another our wives and sweethearts. He faces the facts of human nature honestly, and, so doing, finds it impossible to escape from the truth that the world is very far from such general enlightenment as will render unnecessary the use of force; and he can devise no method for bringing about such enlightenment.

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DIRECT ACTION OF PUBLIC OPINION

The other form of extreme pacificism is less naïve and more widely entertained. Recognizing that civilization requires for its protection armed and well-organized forces ; recognizing also that the public opinion of each nation is in the main formed and guided by the influence of a relatively small and more educated fraction of the whole, it looks to the formation within each nation of an enlightened and just public opinion, which being in all nations strongly opposed to war and capable of judging rightly the issues of right and wrong between nations, shall by its own weight intimidate or shame into submission any nation that may threaten violence to another. Many of the exponents of this view hold that no machinery, no international organization, is needed to give form and expression to this world-wide public opinion ; they look to the pulpit, the Press and the schools to engender, guide and express it, to render it sufficiently effective to prevent all war, even though nations continue to be armed.

It is only through knowledge of the wide prevalence of this view in the United States that Europeans may understand how the American people, so idealistic, so opposed to war, so warm-hearted and sentimental, justifies to itself with an

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easy conscience its refusal to participate in the League of Nations or actively to support the International Court of Justice. I propose to postpone the examination of this position to the chapter entitled "A League to Enforce Peace", where the arguments for and against it will be as concisely as possible weighed in the balance.

CHAPTER IV

PREVENTIVES OF WAR (*Continued*)

TREATIES OF ARBITRATION

Some of those who would mainly rely upon enlightened world-opinion for the prevention of war, would give it more definite form and aid its application to particular cases of international disagreement by bringing into being a world-wide net of treaties of arbitration. This plan has already made considerable progress towards realization. Let us admit that it is not intrinsically undesirable nor quite impracticable. The question remains—Would it be in itself effective? Would its realization suffice to guarantee us against all war, or to render improbable war on a vast scale and of the most destructive kind? Would it afford to nations that protection and security which alone can allay their fears and render them willing to disarm themselves?

Surely the question needs only to be clearly stated in order to be answered by every honest man, moderately well informed on international affairs! In some cases of disagreement such treaties may prevent the outbreak of war. In

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others they may in various degrees render the outbreak of war less probable, especially by delaying hostile action and giving time for hot blood to cool. But it is vain to hope, dishonest to assert, that every dispute between nations can be amicably settled by arbitration, or even that all nations will observe their self-imposed obligation to submit to arbitration their every claim. Nations are loth to commit themselves unreservedly to the findings of arbitrators. There are some issues so vital, so nearly affecting their very existence, that they cannot trust any arbitrator, or body of arbitrators, chosen from another nation to understand their point of view, to realize fully the bearing of the question in dispute upon their most cherished hopes, their unalterable resolutions. For example, the British determination to maintain at all costs the right to keep open the sea-routes to her coasts seems to every other nation to involve an excessive claim to sea-power, a claim to a predominant position in the world. But to Britain it seems clear that the claim she maintains is nothing more than the claim to continued existence, the claim to the right to feed her millions of industrial workers.

America has been foremost among the nations in promoting the cause of universal arbitration. But her unhappy experience in vainly attempting to arbitrate the

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Tacna-Arica dispute between Chile and Peru should give pause to the most ardent advocates of arbitration as a panacea for the world's greatest evil, the liability to war.

And are there not rights and claims which even America would certainly refuse to submit to arbitration, and which nevertheless may at no distant date be challenged by other peoples? Already we hear it mooted that the raw materials of the whole world should be put into a common pot and dealt out to the various peoples in proportion to their needs. In the present age the most generous, the most useful, of all Nature's gifts, the most valuable of all raw materials, is mineral oil. The American nation possesses a vastly greater supply of oil than any other, and enjoys the use of it in the most lavish fashion. Will it readily submit to the arbitrator who shall assign four-fifths of its supply to other peoples? Will Americans calmly consent to go on foot once more, instead of rolling in luxury on rubber tyres at forty miles an hour? Will they not assert the right of possession?

Already we hear from two powerful and well-armed nations the claim that they must be allowed to find outlets for their surplus populations in congenial territories. Will America submit to the arbitrator who shall award to all Asiatics

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the right of free entrance to and settlement within her borders?

The Philipinos, or all the vocal part of them, have long demanded freedom from the American yoke. Will America at the behest of an arbitration calmly withdraw her hand from that rich Archipelago, where now she seeks to develop her own sources of rubber for her twenty million automobiles? Will she consent to hand over to native incompetence and misrule the population of many millions which she has set upon the path of ordered progress and prosperity? Yet war between America and the Philipinos has been and may be again; and a tribunal of arbitration might well give a verdict in favour of "a nation rightly struggling to be free".

Treaties of arbitration can have no greater binding power than other treaties; and, as Mr. Ponsonby says, "there is no nation which has not been guilty of breaking a treaty when occasion demanded." And again he says, truly enough, "Expediency, not moral right, being in most cases the basis of a treaty, the greater expediency which arises when a nation is in danger will necessitate their breach."

Arbitration treaties are good and useful; but they will not in themselves provide such security or banish all fear of aggression; therefore they will not

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suffice to bring about general disarmament or prevent the recurrence of War.

DISARMAMENT AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

At the present time the attention of men of all nations who actively desire to prevent war is turned upon the proposal to abolish or reduce national armaments. The League of Nations has the problem under consideration. The Washington Conference has shown that something may be achieved in this direction. There is a vague hope abroad. Clear thinking is here exceptionally difficult and absolutely essential.

We must distinguish clearly between two proposals—on the one hand, complete and general disarmament; on the other, some reduction or limitation of armaments.

GENERAL DISARMAMENT

I have already pointed out that complete general disarmament of the civilized nations is not desirable; that its realization would not only imperil all civilization, but also would certainly and speedily lead to its submergence under the hordes of barbarism. Our civilization rests and for an indefinitely long time must rest upon a basis of ordered force.

The chaos in China at the present time well illustrates this truth. There we see

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a peace-loving, intellectual, highly civilized people, with immensely strong and ancient traditions of peace and moral order, imbued with an actual contempt for war, given up to social chaos and wracked with the horrors of civil wars to which no end can be foreseen. The Pacifist will say—Yes, but it is all due to the interference of European powers. If China had been left undisturbed by the outer world, she might have continued her peaceful course indefinitely. To which we reply—Exactly! Behind her Great Wall, strong in her sense of superiority in numbers and in culture, China denounced and despised the arts of war and ceased to cultivate them. Then came the barbarians, Europeans and Americans, and forced upon her their commerce and all the grosser features of their mode of life. In the modern age, as the Pacifists are never weary of telling us, the world is one ; no nation and no group of nations, not even the American nation, can hold itself permanently aloof. All must go forward together, and the standards of the more advanced must wait upon the standards of the more backward.

But, even if we put aside this insuperable objection to complete disarmament, we have the insuperable difficulty that it is not practicable, it cannot be brought about. For no one great nation will be the first to take the step. General

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disarmament must be simultaneous and by common consent of all nations, as Mr. Ponsonby rightly insists. And there is no prospect of bringing about such simultaneous and general consent within any reasonable period, unless general security can first be assured. Unless somehow security can be provided, it is perfectly idle to say, as Mr. Ponsonby says: "Disarmament first, and security will follow, and indeed can only follow on disarmament."

And we may go further and question whether security would follow, whether general disarmament (if it were desirable and practicable) would produce security and abolish all danger of war. In these days overwhelming and crushing attack can be made by one nation upon another, especially upon an unarmed nation, by means of a very small military apparatus. A few swift commercial aeroplanes could, by the use of a comparatively small supply of bombs, practically destroy in a few hours the capital of an unprotected nation and reduce to chaos all the delicately balanced processes of its complex life. No international agreements, no visible disarmament, however world-wide, will guarantee nations against this contingency.

It is, no doubt, this consideration which leads some advocates of disarmament to say that we must first have "moral

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disarmament", a complete change of heart of all peoples. That, of course, is to fall back upon the plan of passive resistance to war, rendered world-wide and effective by education and exhortation. That plan we have already examined and found to be in itself hopelessly inadequate to the present needs of the world.

LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

Something has already been accomplished and more may be hoped for along this line. And every limitation, still more every reduction, of armaments, lightens the economic burdens of the nations. Therefore let efforts in this direction continue; they are all to the good. But let us not be foolishly sanguine as to the results that may be achieved. The desirability of reduction is indisputable; its practicability, beyond the very modest steps already achieved, remains to be explored; its probable effectiveness in preventing war must be examined dispassionately.

Let us hear on the question of practicability the voice of one who is a warm friend of the League of Nations, a British Liberal of light and leading, an experienced journalist of the best type. Mr. H. F. Spender has recently published, under the

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title *Is Disarmament Possible?*¹ an article in which he discusses the prospects of reduction of armaments through the good offices of the League of Nations. "It is above all necessary," he writes, "that we should grasp the truth that, so long as the problem remains unsettled and Europe continues to pile up her armaments, the very existence of the League will be imperilled. For the Covenant of the League presupposes a State of Society in which the appeal is to reason and not to force. In a world bristling with bayonets there can be neither goodwill nor a desire for peace. Neither the Rhineland Pact nor the spirit of Locarno will endure unless the signatory nations agree to reduce their armaments and lay aside their fears, suspicions and national antagonisms which a competition in armaments provokes. But how can this be done unless the nations can be persuaded that their security will not be menaced by disarmament. *Here we touch the root of the problem,*² which presupposes a means of moral disarmament, that is to say a change of heart and mind in the attitude of nations to one another." He cites Dr. Benes as saying: "The problem of reduction of armaments bristles with difficulties." And he proceeds to display some of these difficulties.

¹ *Fortnightly Review*, March, 1926.

² *Italics mine.*

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First, what are armaments? Since almost the whole industrial and financial resources of a nation are brought into play in modern war, shall they be reckoned in any attempt to strike a just balance of armaments as between one nation and others? How are we to measure the military value of men, manufacturing power, coal, water-power, oil? How justly compare the defensive needs of the various nations with due reference to the geographic and economic situation of each? How distinguish between offensive and defensive armaments?

France demands an inquiry into the ultimate war-strength of nations. "This, as Lord Cecil pointed out, would lead to no practical result, because it is impossible by any procedure of international negotiation to limit the economic and industrial resources of a country. Moreover, the inquiry would be endless, and might well lead to dangerous friction between the various nations concerned." Yet "if France were to disarm to the same degree as Germany, as far as visible armaments are concerned, she would have no security, because Germany with her larger man-power and superior industrial organization would in a few months prove to be a far stronger military power." He does France justice in attributing her attitude to a genuine and not ill-founded fear of Germany. "*How this fear may*

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be removed so that France may take the real path of safety by a reduction of her armaments. . . . is the problem which has to be solved." He writes of the root of the difficulty which faces the League as being "*the distrust and fear which still brood over Europe.*"¹ To dispel these is the important work that has yet to be achieved before real progress with the limitation of armaments can be made." Italy is a formidable difficulty. And at the very outset stands the difficulty that, while France, Italy and Japan demand that all form of armaments shall be discussed together, America and Great Britain require that naval armaments shall be separately considered.

Mr. Spender's mournful conclusion is that, in spite of the spirit of Locarno, the outlook for any serious reduction or even limitation of armaments is not hopeful.

There is another all-important fact which, in the world's present concern for the reduction of armaments, is apt to be overlooked. Namely, even if the present efforts to bring about reduction of armaments were largely successful, if, let us say, the present negotiations were to lead to reduction of all national armaments by fifty per cent., or even by seventy-five, or ninety per cent., we still should have secured only an amelioration

¹ Italics mine.

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of our condition; we should have effected no cure of the great disease. The economic burdens of the nations would be lightened; and the tendency of armaments to go off of themselves or in hair-trigger fashion (which too often is falsely represented as the principal cause of war) would be greatly diminished. But we should have provided no security against aggression. To some extent the fear of aggression might be diminished; but it would not be abolished. The effectiveness of defensive power is wholly relative to the power of the aggressor; and, as was pointed out above, even complete abolition of visible national armaments would not in itself provide that complete security which alone can allay the fear of aggression.

Further, experience in the Great War has shown how an industrial and non-military nation can within a few months build up a vast army and equip it with all the apparatus of war. The old delusion that it takes three years to make a useful soldier has been dispelled. And, as war becomes more and more a matter of the manipulation of mechanical devices, the difference in military value between the trained soldier and the skilled artizan tends to disappear and, with it, the difference between the nation specially prepared for war and the nation merely equipped with first-rate manufacturing

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power. In view of these facts it may well be questioned whether the delay in the outbreak of war which may be hoped for from arbitration-treaties would be an unmitigated gain; for such delay would enable nations to concentrate all their manufacturing power upon preparations for the war that might come if arbitration should fail.

ECONOMIC PACTS AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE

Raw materials, markets, tariff-barriers, monetary exchanges, these are the economic centres of interest for the agents of peace. For in them lie great possibilities of both war and peace. Left to the course of nature, to the so-called iron laws of economics, they are the great fields of international competition; but also they are susceptible of being exploited as fields for international co-operation; and further they contain possibilities, hitherto hardly explored, of being used as actual preventives of war.

It is now only too clear that the old Cobdenite principles are illusory. The mere abolition of tariffs and the prevalence of free trade throughout the world would render the competition for raw materials more acute and would intensify and embitter the competition between nations for higher standards of life and

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comfort. Those that have attained a high standard of life would keenly feel and bitterly resent the competition of hundreds of millions of industrious workers, content to toil for the bare necessities.

It is as instruments for the positive repression of aggressive tendencies that these economic factors offer possibilities of manipulation. The Chinese have shown us how a whole people can set at naught "the iron laws of economics" and use the economic boycott as a national instrument. Fortunately, the nations most powerful in war are the most industrialized, the most dependent for continued prosperity on maintenance of friendly relations with other nations, and, therefore, the most sensitive to economic pressure. It is therefore proposed that the whole world, acting through the League of Nations, shall use the economic boycott and the threat of it to repress the warlike tendencies of nations. There can be no doubt that Great Britain, if she went upon the warpath, would quickly be reduced to passivity by the absolute refusal of the whole of the rest of the world, including the sister nations of her Commonwealth, to provide her with food. The same would be true of Italy and her coal supply; perhaps at present and in the near future of the United States and her rubber supply.

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But there are two great weaknesses of any such scheme for world-wide economic pressure. First, the nations, foreseeing these possibilities, are tending more and more to make themselves, or to group themselves, into great economic units, each of which shall be as nearly as possible independent of others for all essentials of economic life, units such as the United States, the British Commonwealth, Russia, Central Europe, France and her satellites, or possibly all of Western Europe. And, in proportion as these tendencies are realized, economic pressure as a preventive of war must become less and less effective.

Secondly, it must be a matter of the greatest difficulty to secure the faithful co-operation of all nations in applying such economic pressure. When some nations apply the boycott, opportunities for making immense profits will be offered to others, or to the traders of other nations. And the temptation will be too strong for some of them. Yet in order that economic pressure may be effective, all nations must faithfully co-operate and each one must strictly impose upon all its traders the observance of the boycott.

It seems to me only too clear that, even if the League of Nations were all-inclusive, the conjunction of these two difficulties would probably be too great an obstacle to the effective application of the boycott. And it is still clearer

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that, so long as great countries rich in markets, in raw materials, in financial resources, like the United States and Russia, remain outside the League, economic pressure must remain but a feeble instrument for the prevention of war.

And there is another fact new in the history of the world which must here be taken into account. It is no longer possible to hold over nations any threat of severe punishment for any aggression, any infraction of treaties or of Law of Nations. In bygone ages a nation that undertook aggressive enterprises ran the risk of being trampled in the dirt, of being virtually destroyed. But now, no sooner is peace restored, than the rest of the world must hasten to the assistance of the conquered nation, feeding its masses, restoring its industries, re-establishing its finances. Self-interest and philanthropy combine to render such actions inevitable. Hence the modern State knows that in making war it risks only the losses incidental to the period of war. It knows that, no matter how gross its defiance of all laws and all principles of justice and humanity, it will, even if unsuccessful, soon be put upon its feet once more and restored to its former position in the comity of nations. It is as though our domestic justice were to renounce completely the principle of

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punishment ; so that the highway robber should know that his only risks are those incidental to his act of violence ; he may reckon upon it that, if during its commission he should be so unlucky as to receive a nasty knock, he will be carried to hospital, carefully nursed back to health, and restored to his place in society with the least possible delay ; for society is very humane and it cannot afford to dispense with his services.

In face of this situation, a nation may well be tempted to risk a rapid blow, hoping to present the world with a *fait accompli*, and to carry off the swag without so much damage as a continuing loss of reputation. For it knows only too well that the world's powers of moral discrimination and moral indignation are very feeble ; the former easily hoodwinked, the latter easily exhausted or allayed by the wise saw—" You cannot indict a whole nation."

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTLAWING WAR

Many voices, especially in America, demand that war shall be outlawed. I have tried in vain to discover behind this cry some trace of rationality, some evidence of considered purpose, some plan of action, however impracticable or ineffective. I suppose that to outlaw

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any particular practice or form of action means to pass a law against it, to make it criminal, legally indictable, punishable, and preventible by executive action. But in the present state of the world nothing of this kind is possible against war between nations. We can only outlaw, or put outside the pale of legally recognized action, that which lies already within it. But war does not lie within any such pale. There is no law which sanctions or legalizes it; there is no law-making power which can declare it to be illegal. Those who utter this cry are probably misled by the current usage of the term "International Law". The existence of the term, of textbooks bearing it on the title-page, and of professors who claim to expound International Law, has presumably imposed on them the dangerous delusion that International Law already exists. This delusion is one of the great obstacles to clear thinking in this matter of war and peace. It may be dispelled by a little critical reflection. Without going into the metaphysics of jurisprudence, we may note the view that all law exists or subsists in some supernal realm of ideas, or in principles of right and justice that are as timeless and eternal as the principles of geometry, and that human effort cannot make, but can only discover, laws. Without stopping to inquire whether bad laws as well as good

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laws enjoy this supernal existence, we may escape these subtleties by distinguishing effective law from law in general. We are concerned only with effective law or laws. Effective law presupposes not only its discovery by man, but also its recognition and establishment within a given society or community, either by way of statute or by way of the customs of the people and the rulings of judicial tribunals. Further, effective law presupposes effective sanctions: that is to say, law, in order to be effective, must be supported by sanctions which effectively oppose the breach of it or in some degree tend in that direction by imposing punishment for offences against it.

Now, none of these things is true of so-called International Law. It may be true that the moral sense of the better part of mankind has accepted certain conventions which have been formulated in textbooks and even accepted as guides by jurists in dealing with matters of dispute between nations. But so-called International Law is hitherto not effective law; first, because it has been established neither by any international legislative body nor by any judicial tribunal that expresses the opinion of the world at large or is accepted by more than one nation as an authoritative exponent of its moral principles; secondly, because it commands, is supported by, no sanctions other than

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a vague general disapproval directed towards those nations which ignore these international conventions. All this is not to say that "International Law" as it exists is of no value and should not be held in high esteem. I merely insist that "International Law" as now existing is not effective law and that to be misled by the term into regarding it as such is to be disqualified for serious discussion of international problems. A large part of the civilized world has accepted certain principles of international right or justice; but these have not yet been given the status of effective law. How to give them that status is of the very essence of our problem.

INTERNATIONALISM AND ABOLITION OF NATIONALITY

The spirit of nationality is strong in the world. Its critics say it is rampant. And they say truly that it is a prime factor in engendering international wars; for, if it ceased to exist, nations would soon cease to exist, and there could be no war between non-existent nations. From these considerations some of the critics draw the simple precept: Let us undermine nationalism and the spirit of nationality; nations then will soon coalesce into one great human brotherhood or cosmopolitan society and war will

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cease. This prescription, if it could be applied, would certainly be effective in abolishing international war. But is its realization desirable? Is it practicable? I will not here delay to argue the former question. In other works¹ I have argued the case at length and shown, as it seems to me, that the nation or nationhood is an indispensable instrument for the realization of the good life for an increasing number of mankind. It may suffice here to point out that the proposal is impracticable in the last degree. With every advance of education among the peoples of the world, nationalism has become correspondingly more pronounced, and there is every reason to believe that this will continue to be the rule.

Even if all that the critics of nationalism charge against it were true, and if there were nothing to be said on the other side, nationalism is so congenial to human nature, is so concordant with democracy, is so natural and spontaneous a growth in a world in which all men claim to exercise a voice in the determination of public affairs, that the policy of uprooting it in favour of any scheme of cosmopolitan world-organization would be a vastly difficult one requiring a long continued and world-wide campaign of education.

¹ Especially in my *Group Mind* and my *Ethics and Some Modern World Problems*.

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And, since there is so much to be said on the other side that the vast preponderance of educated opinion regards the existence of nations as necessary and highly conducive to human advancement, such policy has not the slightest prospect of success.

The policy of abolishing nationalities is not Internationalism. Internationalism is the policy of combining nations in a higher unity, a commonwealth of nations, within which each may preserve its distinctive features, may cultivate its peculiar merits, and continue its work of protecting, guiding and stimulating its citizens, facilitating for them in all possible ways the pursuit of the good life.

In only one way does Internationalism require the abatement of the spirit of nationality: namely, it requires that each nation shall be prepared to abjure its claims to absolute sovereignty and independence; that it shall abate this claim just in so far as may be necessary for the establishment of such international justice and of such effective international law as will render possible the peaceful co-operation of nations.

Such abatement of the absolute sovereignty of nations is implied in the very conception of International Law, is implied by every scheme that can be devised for the amicable settlement of differences between nations. It is involved

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in submission to arbitration, and in every pledge given by a nation as one which it intends to keep. Still more clearly is it involved in the acceptance of any effective sanctions for the support of international pledges of any kind. There can be no enduring peace in a world of nations, unless nations will consent to give such binding pledges to one another and, in so far, to submit to abatement of absolute sovereignty.

It is, then, gross inconsistency when the citizens of a State which most jealously refuses to support any scheme that would impair, however little, its absolute sovereignty, set up a cry for the outlawry of war.

Let us consider briefly an objection commonly raised against the League of Nations and equally likely to be raised against every step leading towards true Internationalism, I mean the bogey of the Super-State. There is a form of Internationalism which aims at constituting a World-State or Super-State, a State which shall include all nations and which shall absorb as much as possible of the functions of the existing States. When the American Union was formed a Super-State on this model was created. For all practical purposes the several States of the Union lost their independence and a very large part of their sovereignty; and throughout the subsequent period

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the Super-State thus formed has continued to absorb more of the rights and functions of the subordinate States. Internationalism of this kind is anti-national. But there is a truer and more acceptable Internationalism, namely, that which, appreciating the value of nationality and desiring to preserve intact as far as possible the rights and functions of nations, would invite them to abate their claims to absolute sovereignty only in so far as that may be necessary for self-preservation and the preservation of civilization, for the avoidance of mutually destructive warfare, and for the facilitation of voluntary co-operation between nations in all those matters, such as the control of epidemics, in which all are interested but in respect of which none can take effective isolated action.

To set up a cry of "Super-State" whenever a proposal for international co-operation is mooted is to work against peace by raising a bogey. All personal liberty is obtained and can be preserved, not by perpetual vigilance alone, but also by the voluntary repudiation of licence, licence to interfere with the liberties of others. Only by resigning the licence of highway robbery, of the vendetta, the duel, and the blood-feud, the liberty to be judge, jury and policeman in his own cause, does the individual citizen acquire the liberty to come and go freely and safely

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about his lawful affairs, the liberty that is assured him only by organized and justly directed force. If the licence thus resigned is also to be called liberty, then we must recognize that, in order to enjoy liberty in respect to all that is most worth doing, we have to resign our liberty to do certain things that are not worth doing. In respect of this fundamental law of liberty, nations are in like case with individuals. In order to secure the higher forms of liberty, liberty to develop all that is best in the national life and institutions, each nation must sacrifice the lower forms of "liberty", liberty to strike a blow at a neighbour whenever it is moved by anger, liberty to be judge, jury and executioner in its own cause, in short, liberty to make war whenever it is moved thereto by the ineradicable passions of human nature. The refusal of nations to recognize, to accept, this fundamental and inevitable law of liberty is the main obstacle in the way of enduring peace.

CHAPTER V

THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTER- NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Soon after the outbreak of the Great War there was formed in America an association whose purpose it was to found a *League to enforce Peace*. Europe, wracked by war, paid no attention to it ; but it was a momentous and highly significant effort.

Among the founders and active leaders of that association were men of the greatest experience in political and international affairs, men of the most mature learning and of the greatest practical experience, men acknowledged on all hands to be honoured leaders of the American people. Its principal officers were Chief Justice Taft and President Lawrence Lowell, and among its members were eminent professors of international law, leading divines, a cardinal, one of the most influential of the Rabbis, several famous ambassadors, editors, bankers, and college presidents. These eminent men proposed a *League to enforce Peace* because they

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believed that only by the use of international force can we hope to prevent the outbreak of new wars.

When the League of Nations was constituted the League to enforce Peace was dissolved; for its members felt that this great and beneficent purpose had been accomplished. They believed that the League of Nations was a League of the kind they held to be essential for the future peace of the world, a League to enforce Peace. And the Covenant of the League of Nations justified that hope and that belief. For it included Articles X and XVI. Article X pledged the members of the League to defend one another against aggression; Article XVI pledged the member nations to apply the economic boycott against any other member-nation that might make war in defiance of its covenants; and it also assigned to the Council of the League the duty of *recommending* "to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League."

It has now become clear that the League of Nations is not a League to enforce Peace. Article XVI has been amended, and the amended form of the article contains no reference to the use, or recommendation of the use, of armed

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force to protect the covenants of the League. And, though the Article still provides for the use of economic boycott in order to prevent military aggression, or bring it quickly to an end, this provision has been found to be impracticable. Already in 1924 the author of the Bok Peace Plan was able to assert that "Articles X and XVI in their original forms have therefore been practically condemned by the principal organs of the League and are to-day reduced to something like innocuous desuetude." And he added that the League of Nations "can employ no force but that of persuasion and moral influence. Its only actual powers are to confer and advise, to create commissions, to exercise inquisitive, conciliative and arbitral functions, and to help elect judges of the Permanent Court".

The award of the Bok Prize to Dr. Levermore's essay by the panel of eminent and highly competent judges shows that the opinion thus expressed by him was endorsed by them.

An important part of the intention with which the League of Nations was constituted has thus not been realized. In this most important respect the scope and functions of the League have already been profoundly modified and restricted. The League was intended and designed to use economic pressure and armed force

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for the prevention of military aggression. It has now resigned those pretensions.

• This change in the scope and functions of the League of Nations is the expression of a profound divergence of opinion among the supporters and friends of the League. On the one hand are those who believe that, in the present state of the world, the use of physical force is necessary for the maintenance of law. On the other hand are those who believe and freely assert that physical force, or the command of force as a potential instrument of Justice, is not necessary for the support of law and order.

These two groups of the friends of peace, thus profoundly divided, are struggling for mastery. It might seem that the restriction of the scope and functions of the League which we have noted proves the latter group, the no-force group, to be the more numerous and influential throughout the world. But any such inference would be a grave misinterpretation of the signs of the times. Among those who believe that physical force is needed for the support and enforcement of law, and who wish to see the League of Nations wield such force, are very many persons who are prepared to say "If the use of physical force by the League is impracticable let us nevertheless support the League, and hope for the best. Though it may be

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unable to prevent military aggression or to punish it in any way, yet it may do much good of a minor sort; it can ventilate international disagreements; it can attempt to bring about arbitration; and it can promote international co-operation in affairs of public health and public morals." The no-force party has thus enjoyed a very great advantage in this struggle. For a world-wide agreement in support of the League is a necessary condition of its success. And the no-force party says in effect: "If the League is to use force we will withdraw our support." And it is numerous enough to make this threat a very serious one.¹

And the no-force party has enjoyed two other very great advantages. Namely, first, the advantage which arose from the great practical difficulty of ensuring to the League of Nations the effective command of adequate physical force in support of International Law. Secondly, the advantage of being able to assert

¹ Actually, the abandonment by the League of all intention to use force, or the threat of force, for the protection of its covenants seems to have been chiefly due to the strong desire to secure the adhesion of America. And the American people, having little or no experience of the horrors of war, and feeling secure in its own strength, was less disposed than any other to make that sacrifice of absolute sovereignty which acceptance of the element of compulsion implies.

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that, even if the League could command adequate armed forces, the drawbacks attending the use of them would outweigh the benefits.

* Let us examine briefly these two difficulties or objections. It was implied in Articles X and XVI as originally adopted that each member-nation should hold its armed forces at the disposal of the League for the purposes of international police-work. But, even if all the Governments concerned should solemnly pledge themselves to respond to any call by the League for such police-forces, it is only too clear that such a pledge would be of little worth. It is certain that in this democratic age, the populace of any country is likely to refuse to take up arms, or to permit its government to redeem any such pledge, when the occasion arises. The threat of a general strike would be, and has already been, effectively used to prevent a Government from redeeming such a pledge.¹ That any such pledge is worthless is, then, a very strong argument for the no-force party. For if this proposition is true, and it can hardly be seriously questioned, Article XVI of the Covenant of the

¹ I refer to the instance in which the British Government was prevented in this way from rendering assistance to Poland when she was attacked by Bolshevist armies.

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League, in so far as it proposed the use of force, was futile and illusory. It invited the nations to entrust their safety to a force which had no real existence.

Secondly, if we disregard this difficulty, and assume that the nations could and would effectively support pledges of armed assistance to the League given by their Governments, there would remain a very serious drawback inseparable from the plan. It proposes to stop war by going to war; it proposes that, in order to stop a war between two nations, an indefinite number of other and peaceful nations shall plunge into war, extending indefinitely the area of bloody conflict and the number of men exposed to death and mutilation, thus magnifying enormously the suffering and the economic waste which all war involves. This argument of the no-force party is very effective. It was used by the late Mr. W. J. Bryan in a written debate in which (in 1917) he undertook to criticize the proposals of the League to enforce Peace. Chief Justice Taft, as president of that League, was the other party to the debate. He defended the League's proposal of an "agreement of all the powerful nations of the world to unite their armies and their navies to resist the premature hostilities of one or more nations against another". To this proposal Mr. Bryan

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replied in effect : You propose to abolish war by making more war ; you propose that, when war breaks out in any corner of the earth, it shall at once be made world-wide. It must, I think, be confessed that, in spite of all the persuasive skill and force of Mr. Taft, the answer of Mr. Bryan was very effective and cannot be lightly brushed aside.

At the time when the League to enforce Peace was active, and when this debate between Mr. Taft and Mr. Bryan took place, there was only one alternative plan which Mr. Taft and his League could have proposed. Instead of proposing that each nation should pledge itself to hold its military forces at the disposal of an International League, he might have proposed that such a League should be authorized to raise and equip an international police-force. It is, I think, fairly obvious why this alternative plan was not proposed. For it was clear that such an international force, adequate to enforce peace, would necessarily have been a very large one. It must have been a force of some million or perhaps two million men, professional and mercenary fighting men, constantly under arms, constantly trained in all the methods of modern war, and fully equipped with all the hideous and costly instruments of modern war, the guns of all calibres, the bombs and poison gases, the tanks

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and aircraft, the battleships and cruisers, the submarines, etc.

Such an international police-force would be in itself a grave moral evil and a serious political danger ; to which must be added the minor objection that the financial burden of its upkeep would be very considerable. These drawbacks are so obvious and so great that, so far as I am aware, no proposal of such an international army and navy has been made by any influential body of persons.

It is, I venture to affirm, these great practical difficulties and these grave drawbacks which seemed inseparable from every plan for an international police force which have given the victory to the no-force party in the present great controversy. For few men will assert that an effective police-power for the support of International Law is not desirable in itself. If we could have an international police-power that would not be in itself a moral evil and danger and could give sure protection to peaceful nations against military aggression, even the peace-at-any-price people would not reject it, but rather would welcome it. The essence of their contentions may be stated as follows: " War is the greatest of evils, and so we will not go to war for any purpose no matter how good and noble it may seem, and we will not do anything that may contribute in any way

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to initiate or support war." That is the substance of Mr. Bryan's reply to Mr. Taft; it is what the Rev. Mr. Harry Fosdick says in his introduction to Mr. Kirby Page's book on war. It is what they all say. And, in view of the horribleness of modern war, I, for one, would admit that perhaps they are right.

The acceptance of the extreme Tolstoian doctrine that all use of force is wrong is not, then, the ground on which the no-force party repudiates the use of force in support of international law and justice. We may fairly assume that a large proportion, perhaps a majority, of them accept rather the clear teaching of Jesus Christ, who both by words and deeds affirmed that, if by the use of force we can prevent men from doing evil, we should not hesitate to use it. They assert rather that war is a poor and doubtful remedy for war. Yet such was the remedy proposed by those who founded the League to enforce Peace.

FORCE AS A NECESSARY SUPPORT OF LAW AND ORDER

There is, however, a considerable number of persons who refuse to consider any proposal for the use of force because, like Tolstoy and the Quakers, they accept the abstract proposition that all use of force is wrong. The emotional

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energy with which they hold to and assert this general proposition, the plausible nature of it, and its congruence with our humane sentiments, gives to such persons an influence disproportionate to their numbers. It seems therefore worth while to examine their position a little more closely.

Save for a few utterly irrational fanatics, those who repudiate all use of force in international affairs really take their stand, not on the simple proposition that all use of force is wrong, but rather on the proposition that the use of force in international affairs is wrong because a better way is open to us for the abolition of war and the effective support of international law and justice. They do not assert that no sanctions are required, but they maintain that the enlightened public opinion of the world should be and may be made a sufficient sanction for the maintenance of international law and order.

Now it is obvious that such public opinion has not been hitherto a sufficient sanction. But it is maintained that the League of Nations, by diffusing more widely a knowledge of and interest in international affairs and by focussing and giving expression to the public opinion of the world, may render it an effective sanction. This really involves two propositions: first, that the world (or

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the enlightened part of it whose opinion counts) is capable of forming a correct and just opinion on all matters in dispute between nations. Secondly, that such opinion, focussed and openly expressed, will be a sufficient sanction. These require separate examination.

As regards highly general principles of international conduct, the former proposition is, no doubt, correct. We may expect general support for such maxims as that nations should not commit unprovoked aggression, that they should treat one another with courtesy and consideration, and abstain from all provocation. But it is in the application of such agreed principles to particular cases that difficulties arise. Let us remember that during the Great War the opinions of neutral nations were by no means concordant on the moral issues involved; that in the United States, President Wilson, supported by approximately half of his people, maintained for some years the view that the cause of one group of antagonists was in no way morally preferable to that of the other group. And even at the present time twelve years after the outbreak of the war, the controversy as to the moral responsibility for its inception still goes on. In this respect the Great War is not exceptional. Let the reader try to name one war of the nineteenth century

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the moral issues of which are not still a matter of disagreement. In almost all cases of international disagreement, a very delicate inquiry, conducted with full command of all the facts, is alone capable of arriving at a just opinion. Such inquiry is a judicial function: and it is in order that such judicial inquiry may be made for the guidance of world-opinion that the International Court of Justice has been established.

We may reasonably assume that this International Court of Justice is capable of arriving at a just opinion in all cases brought before it; and that its verdict will be accepted by a greatly preponderant part of the world. Assuming this to be true and assuming further (what is by no means probable) that the United States and all other nations will shortly give adhesion to the Court, it is necessary to insist that, even then, two great desiderata will remain unrealized: namely, first, some means of ensuring that the Court shall have time and opportunity to complete its inquiry and to issue its verdict before any military action is taken by either party to the dispute; secondly, some means of ensuring that, when the Court shall have pronounced its verdict, the nations concerned in the matter shall loyally accept and abide by its ruling. The lack of the former is perhaps the more serious deficiency

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of the apparatus of International Justice centring in the Court. It may well be urged that, when and if a clear verdict shall have been pronounced by the Court, no nation will venture to ignore it, and, flying in the face of world-opinion, proceed to take violent measures for the attainment of its desired object. That, however, remains an open question which only experience of the working of the Court can determine. But it is only too clear that it may be very difficult to hold nations to the obligation of submitting their case to the Court and awaiting its verdict, before taking action.

To each nation the justice of its own cause is apt to seem so indisputable, the wrong it suffers so gross and flagrant, that the notion of allowing redress to wait upon the leisurely procedure of a Court that will gather evidence, slowly set it in order, and deliberately weigh it, must seem preposterous. And if in such a case a nation shall have achieved sufficient self-control to await the verdict, what will be its emotion when that verdict goes against it, outraging, to its judgment, every principle of right and justice? Will it not be a new burst of anger, now more than ever tinged with self-justifying moral indignation? Shall it sacrifice its most vital interests, because the judges of a court of law (drawn from diverse nations) cannot see the wood for

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the trees, or have been swayed, as it may well seem, by some jealousy of a Great Power, a jealousy to which they, as citizens of rival nations, cannot be immune.

Those who deprecate every proposal for the use of ordered force for the regulation of international affairs often seek a parallel to the course of events they contemplate in the decline of the practice of duelling. Just as men, it is said, have forsworn and condemned that practice, as they have grown more civilized, so nations, as they become more truly civilized, will forswear and condemn the practice of international war. The parallel is a valid one ; let us accept its plain teaching. The practice of duelling has declined only in proportion as men have been assured of redress for their injuries at the hands of the courts of justice. But it did not suffice that the Courts should pronounce upon the merits of the case. If they had done nothing more than that, duelling would have continued to flourish. The Courts were armed with authority to impose punishment, and with force to apply it, both on him who was found guilty and on him who, refusing to await its verdict, took the law into his own hands. Without this command of force Courts of Justice could have done little or nothing to abolish the duel ; and without it they

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will be able to do but little towards the abolition of war.

The need of force as support to the findings of an International Court is far greater than in the case of a Court which adjudicates between persons. In the latter case the person against whom judgment is given finds himself surrounded by men who accept the Court's verdict and a public opinion which, if he should seek to defy it, would press upon him with immense weight. But, in the case of a nation against whom the verdict of a Court is given, each member of it will be likely to find himself surrounded by others of like feeling with himself, fellow-citizens who will share his resentment and in so doing fan it into a fierce flame ; while the opinion of the outside world, unanimous though it may be, will come to him only in faint echoes through the Press.

From his fellow citizens he receives that immediate intensification of emotion which only personal contact can give in full strength ; the opinion of the outer world he learns of only in the form of highly general and abstract verbal propositions.

Those who point to the absence of violence in the lives of good citizens of peaceful States as a model for the life of nations are apt to forget that the quiet citizen is absolved from all need

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to use force in defence of his rights only because he has delegated the use of force to a special body of his fellow-citizens, who apply it vicariously on his behalf under the direction of constituted authority. Without police force our civilized life could not continue a day. In some great cities (especially in America, whence comes in strongest volume the cry against all force in international affairs) the most vigorous application of such force does not suffice to prevent the occurrence every day of the most dastardly outrages. And in those few instances (as in Boston some years ago) in which the police of a great modern city have gone on strike, we have had impressively demonstrated, by the immediate outbreak of violent disorder, the truth that liberty and justice live only in so far as they are supported by force.

The domestic parallel validly illustrates also another truth applicable to international affairs. The more highly organized and effective the force which supports law and justice, the less does that force need to be put into actual operation. Within the well-ordered nation the actual use of force is so slight that it may almost seem to those who carelessly enjoy its protection that no force is needed. But the truth is, of course, that so little force is used just because, if necessary, it can be used at a moment's notice in

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unlimited volume and with overwhelming effect. Those, then, who insist on the necessity and morality of putting organized force in support of International Justice do not contemplate a world in which that force will be frequently brought into active operation ; rather they justly look forward to a time when such force shall be so effectively organized and directed that the need of putting it into operation will never arise.

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CITATIONS FROM WRITINGS OF ROOSEVELT AND BRYCE

The late Theodore Roosevelt not only filled with distinction the most influential office in the whole world ; he also raised to a new height the prestige of that great office ; and his personal achievement was such that, when he retired from that office, he was able to make across Europe a journey that was more than a royal progress ; as he passed he lectured emperors and kings and powerful Governments upon their duties, and his admonitions were respectfully received. I mention these facts to remind my younger readers that Roosevelt was more than an able journalist and more than a President of the United States. He was a statesman of great experience and of passionate enthusiasm in the cause of international justice. During the Great War he published a number of essays dealing with the causes and the prevention of war. Europe was wholly preoccupied with the conduct of the war and these essays therefore never enjoyed that world-wide hearing which they deserved

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and in quieter times would have found. It seems worth while therefore to bring together here a few of their most forcible passages in which Roosevelt insisted upon the necessity and the moral justification for the use of force in international affairs. And I add a similar passage from the writings of the late Lord Bryce, than whom none was better qualified to express a weighty opinion on this disputed and most urgent question.

In order to give full weight to Roosevelt's words, I will point out that, if Roosevelt had been still President of the United States when the Great War broke out, that war would, in all probability, have been brought to an end by the submission of the Central Powers before the end of the year 1915, and the world would have been spared an immense sum of slaughter, suffering, hatred and economic loss.

FOREWORD TO "AMERICA AND THE WORLD WAR"

"Dante reserved a special place of infamy in the inferno for those base angels who dared side neither with evil nor with good. Peace is ardently to be desired, but only as the handmaid of righteousness. The only peace of permanent value is the peace of righteousness. There can be no such peace until

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well-behaved, highly civilized small nations are protected from oppression and subjugation."

"All the actions of the ultra pacifists" for a generation past, all their peace congresses and peace conventions have amounted to precisely and exactly nothing in advancing the cause of peace. The peace societies of the ordinary pacifist type have in the aggregate failed to accomplish even the smallest amount of good, have done nothing whatever for peace, and the very small effect they have had on their own nations has been, on the whole, slightly detrimental. Although usually they have been too futile to be even detrimental, their unfortunate tendency has so far been to make good men weak and to make virtue a matter of derision to strong men."

"In every serious crisis the present Hague conventions and the peace and arbitration and neutrality treaties of the existing type have proved not to be worth the paper on which they were written. This is because no method was provided of securing their enforcement, of putting force behind the pledge. Peace treaties and arbitration treaties unbacked by force are not merely useless but mischievous in any serious crisis."

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"From the international standpoint the essential thing to do is effectively to put the combined power of civilization back of the collective purpose of civilization to secure justice. This can be achieved only by a world league for the peace of righteousness, which would guarantee to enforce by the combined strength of all the nations the decrees of a competent and impartial court against any recalcitrant and offending nation."

DUTY OF SELF-DEFENCE

"The policeman must be put back of the judge in municipal law. The effective power of civilization must be put back of civilization's collective purpose to secure reasonable justice between nation and nation."

"It should ever be our honourable effort to serve one of the world's most vital needs by doing all in our power to bring about conditions that will give some effective protection to weak or small nations which themselves keep order and act with justice toward the rest of mankind."

HOW TO STRIVE FOR WORLD PEACE

"Looking back at the real and ultimate causes . . . of the war, what has occurred is due primarily to the intense fear felt

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by each nation for other nations. Doubtless in certain elements, notably certain, militaristic elements, of the population, other motives have been at work; but I believe that the people of each country, in backing the government of that country, in the present war have been influenced mainly by a genuine patriotism and a genuine fear of what might happen to their beloved land in the event of aggression by other nations."

THE CAUSES OF WAR

"It is idle merely to make speeches and write essays against this fear, because at present the fear has a real basis. At present each nation has cause for the fear it feels. Each nation has cause to believe that its national life is in peril unless it is able to take the national life of one or more of its foes or at least hopelessly to cripple that foe. The causes of fear must be removed or, no matter what peace may be patched up to-day or what new treaties may be negotiated to-morrow, these causes will at some future day bring about the same results, bring about a repetition of this same awful tragedy."

THE PEACE OF RIGHTEOUSNESS

"We must stand absolutely for righteousness. But to do so is utterly

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without avail unless we possess the strength and the loftiness of spirit which will back righteousness with deeds and not mere words. We must clear the rubbish from off our souls and admit that everything that has been done in passing peace treaties, arbitration treaties, neutrality treaties, Hague treaties, and the like, with no sanction of force behind them, amounts to literally and absolutely zero, to literally and absolutely nothing, in any time of serious crisis. We must recognize that to enter into foolish treaties which cannot be kept is as wicked as to break treaties which can and ought to be kept. We must labour for an international agreement among the great civilized nations which shall put the full force of all of them back of any one of them, and of any well-behaved weak nation, which is wronged by any other power."

PREPAREDNESS AGAINST WAR

"International peace will only come when the nations of the world form some kind of League which provides for an international tribunal to decide on international matters, which declares that treaties and international agreements are never to be entered into recklessly and foolishly, and when once entered into are to be observed with entire

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good faith, and which puts the collective force of civilization behind such treaties and agreements and court decisions and against any wrong-doing or recalcitrant nation. The all-inclusive arbitration treaties negotiated by the present administration amount to almost nothing. They are utterly worthless for good."

"In its essence this plan means that there shall be a great international treaty for the peace of righteousness; that this treaty shall explicitly secure to each nation and exempt from the operations of any international tribunal such matters as its territorial integrity, honour, and vital interest, and shall guarantee it in the possession of these rights; that this treaty shall therefore by its own terms explicitly provide against making foolish promises which cannot be kept and ought not to be kept; that this treaty shall be observed with absolute good faith—for it is worse than useless to enter into treaties until their observance in good faith is efficiently secured. Finally, and most important, this treaty shall put force back of righteousness, shall provide a method of securing by the exercise of force the observation of solemn international obligations. This is to be accomplished by all the powers covenanting to put their whole strength back of the fulfilment

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of the treaty obligations, including the decrees of the court established under and in accordance with the treaty."

WORLD PEACE

"Our business is to make force the agent of justice, the instrument of right in international matters as it has been made in municipal matters, in matters within each nation."

"The essential thing to do is to free each nation from the besetting fear of its neighbour. This can only be done by removing the causes of such fear. The neighbour must no longer be in danger."

"What is needed in international matters is to create a judge and then to put police power back of the judge."

Finally Roosevelt cited the words of one whose opinion may carry for many readers even more weight than his own, namely the late Lord Bryce:—

"No scheme for preventing future wars will have any chance of success unless it rests upon the assurance that the States which enter it will loyally and steadfastly abide by it, and that each and all of them will join in coercing by their overwhelming united strength any State which may disregard the obligations it has undertaken."

CHAPTER VI

INTERNATIONAL AIR-FORCE AS A PREVENTIVE OF WAR.

Our review of the causes and the preventives of war has shown that the central and most immediate cause of war, in which all other causes converge and through which their power to precipitate war is greatly augmented, is the fear of aggression. Each nation fears that it may be suddenly attacked and overwhelmed by some other nation or combination of nations; and it is this fear, far more than any other factor, which prompts them to maintain great armed forces. This fear is the main obstacle to all effective limitation or serious reduction of armaments. And if in any nation, such as the American nation, there are many persons who call for the disarming of their own nation, it is only because that nation enjoys a position or so great security that the need for its protection by armed force seems unlikely to arise.

Security of nations against aggression, especially security against sudden aggression, is, then, the prime need of the world. Only the provision of such

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security can allay the fear which is the principal and immediate cause of war. If such security were provided, or if each nation could feel sure that, in case of unjust aggression against it, the aggressor would be shortly brought to account and duly punished and the wrongs of the victim justly redressed, it might and in most, perhaps all, instances would be content to dispense with all national armaments, and to leave its defence and the redress of its grievances to the strong arm of International Justice. For, if its territory were actually invaded, it would be the part of wisdom and humanity to offer no resistance, to shed no blood, to avoid all the horrors of war, and to receive the invading army with cold courtesy, confidently expecting speedy redress for all wrongs committed by it.

We have found that the proposal to prevent war by intensified campaigns of education and popular enlightenment alone is impracticable. There is no ground for hope that such efforts can prevent war in the near future. We have found that the public opinion of the world, even when focussed, directed and expressed by the League of Nations and the International Court of Justice, will not suffice in itself to prevent aggression or secure redress for wrongs committed by one nation against another.

We have seen that treaties of arbitration

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are in themselves of little effect as guarantees against aggression. We have found that total disarmament of the civilized world is undesirable and impossible, if civilization is to maintain itself against the forces of barbarism.

We have found that any considerable reduction of armaments, though highly desirable, is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to bring about, unless some guarantee against aggression can first be provided.

We have found that economic pacts themselves require the support of effective sanctions and that economic pressure of effective degree cannot be surely brought into play for the enforcement of international undertakings or the prevention of aggression. We have found that the expressions "International Law" and "the outlawry of war" are at present merely delusive terms which do little more than blind those who make much of them to the need for effective International Law.

We have found that the abolition of nationality and of nationalism is undesirable, and impossible to bring about even were it desirable.

We have found that a most weighty body of opinion has asserted the absolute necessity of putting force, latent but highly organized and overwhelming force, at the disposal of International Justice.

INTERNATIONAL AIR-FORCE

But we have seen that an international army and navy large enough to secure the ends of International Justice would be highly undesirable, even if practicable, and that the project put forward by the League to enforce Peace, and originally adopted by the League of Nations, the project, namely, of binding each nation to hold its armed forces at the disposal of an international authority for police purposes is unworkable and, chiefly for that reason, has been abandoned by the League of Nations.

What then remains? Is the civilized world to confess itself incapable of solving its most urgent problem, of finding a cure for its most distressing disease? Are all efforts to abolish war at a deadlock? Must each nation continue as hitherto, arming itself to the teeth, playing for a place in some strong combination of nations, and hoping for luck on the outbreak of the next world war?

Fortunately, the march of science, which has rendered modern war so intensely hideous and destructive, has put into our hands just such an instrument as International Justice needs for its police work, for the prevention of aggression and the redress of international wrongs.

"What is needed in international matters," said Theodore Roosevelt, "is to create a judge and then to put police

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power back of the judge." The world has already created the international judge in the shape of the International Court of Justice. It still requires to create an effective police-force for the support of that judge, for the enforcement of the rulings of the International Court of Justice. And the recent development of aeronautics provides the possibility of such a police-force.

The development of the technique of attack from the air has been so rapid that no one outside the innermost circles of the air-ministries can say now how stupendous may be the forces that may be brought to bear. At the close of the Great War air-power had risen to the first importance, and the public has been allowed to know that since the war further rapid development has taken place. The only partial defence against air-force is counter air-force. Here, then, is an instrument than which none can be conceived better suited to serve the ends of International Justice. Tremendous force, force overwhelming and shattering if once let loose, can be wielded and applied with extreme rapidity by a small highly trained body of experts. If nations could be induced to forego the possession of national air-forces, a comparatively small international air-force, stationed at a few well-chosen centres, could serve effectively as the International Police

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which is required to render International Law effective and to assure International Justice. Above all it could guarantee all nations against sudden aggression, and thus provide that security which can alone banish the fear of aggression and render national armaments of little value; and at the same time it could serve to protect civilization against the attacks of barbaric hordes. The institution of such an international air-force might, then, well lead to general abandonment of national armaments, and might initiate an era of universal peace. For, given the condition that the International air-force were the only one in existence, resistance to it would be hopeless, and no nation would attempt it.

Further, all of the very grave objections and difficulties in the way of international armies and navies (whether standing forces or made up on each occasion of the need for them by levies from national forces) would be reduced to a minimum in the case of an international air-force. The small numbers of the personnel required, the high technical knowledge and training required by it, its grave professional responsibilities, would give it the character of such a body as the personnel of Scotland Yard. Its composition from experts of all nations, intimately co-operating in highly technical work, would prevent its being liable to such national prejudices

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as must always prevail in armies and navies.

When some years ago I pointed to the possibility of using air-force as the police power of International Justice,¹ I urged, that in order to make it effective, it would be necessary to suppress entirely the use of aircraft for commercial purposes; for it seemed possible that commercial aircraft might be almost instantaneously converted into fighting craft that might be used to resist the international police power. And I urged that such suppression was desirable on other grounds, more especially the following: that aircraft promise to render the work of domestic police in suppressing banditry and smuggling indefinitely more difficult; that commercial aircraft will be apt to produce all kinds of international complications; and that, just as the motor-car has ruined the charm, the privacy and the beauty of rural England, so the world-wide and unlimited use of commercial aircraft promises to do the same for the whole world.

However, it seems only too clear that the modern world, obsessed by the desire to move from place to place as rapidly as possible, is not willing to relinquish its latest and most wonderful toy. And fortunately that is not necessary for the

¹ *Ethics and Some Modern World Problems.*

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successful application of air-force as International police power.

The modern fighting air-plane travels at more than 200 miles an hour.¹ The ordinary commercial air-plane can barely attain a rate of 100 miles an hour. Experts have assured me that this difference in speed involves fundamental differences of construction, so that it is not possible to convert the comparatively slow commercial plane into a high-speed machine. Now a speed of 100 miles an hour is ample for all commercial purposes; it renders possible the passage from Europe to America in thirty hours and any journey of a thousand miles in ten hours. It would surely be no great hardship to our speed-merchants, if a maximum possible speed of 100 miles an hour were prescribed for all commercial planes.

The concrete proposal here made is, then, that all nations that have joined the League of Nations shall bind themselves to make, and to permit to be made, for commercial purposes, or to be owned by their nationals, no air-planes capable of a greater speed than 100 miles an hour; and that they shall combine to establish and maintain at the highest point of efficiency an International police-

¹ A pace of 270 miles an hour seems to be the present record.

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force furnished with high-speed planes and all that contributes to make attack from the air irresistibly overwhelming. Such a police-force, distributed in a small number of depots at well-chosen spots, could both directly protect any member nation from aerial attack and, by threatening the capital of any nation, could compel submission to the edicts of the authority controlling the police-force.

What that authority should be may be a matter for discussion, but it would seem to me clear that it should be the International Court of Justice. And that Court, thus backed by overwhelming police-force, should be charged with the primary duty of protecting all members of the League from sudden aggression. The League should make known to the world that it will not permit military attack upon any of its members by *any* power before that power has stated its case, and has allowed a certain interval (say three months) to elapse from the date of such statement. During this period of postponement of hostilities the Court would investigate the claims of both parties and, doubtless, in a large proportion of cases would succeed in bringing about a settlement and in obviating all military action. If the threatened nation were found to be innocent of all offence, the Court would continue to

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maintain its veto against attack upon it. If it were found to be at fault and refused to accept the verdict of the Court and to make amends as prescribed by the Court, the Court would withdraw its protection.

If within the prescribed period of delay either party should take military action against the other, the Court should immediately direct against it sufficient police-force to secure its submission.

Such should be the primary and perhaps the sole application of the International Police-Force.

It would suffice to allay for all members of the League the fear of aggression, and to encourage them to reduce their armed forces to the dimensions required for domestic police work.

Whether the member nations of the League would find it desirable to widen the scope and functions of the International Police-Force would remain a question for the future.

Such use of the International Police-Force would involve a minimum of derogation from the sovereignty of nations. It could hardly be resented as involving the setting up of a Super-State. The most natural extension of its functions would be the use of it to support the just claims or redress the grievances of small and weak nations against strong. But such extension would seem to be unnecessary ; for only the threat of military

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action compels weak nations to submit to the injustices of the strong, and to such threats each member nation of the League would be rendered impervious by the protection afforded to it.

The League of Nations and the International Court of Justice, wielding such protective police-force on behalf of all members of the League, would enjoy a prestige and an influence immensely greater than they can hope to attain so long as they have no such resources. They would have something of great value to offer as an inducement to join the League to nations still outside it.

So long as any powerful nations should remain outside the League, it would be necessary for it to maintain an air-force powerful enough immediately to overwhelm and crush the air-forces of those other nations. That would be an unfortunate necessity of the immediate future. But so many nations are already members of the League that the burden of maintaining an international air-force sufficiently large for this purpose would not be a serious one, distributed as it would be among all members of the League.

We have now to apply to this proposed preventive of war the three test questions we have applied to other proposals, namely, Is it desirable? Is it practicable? Is it likely to be effective?

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IS IT DESIRABLE ?

What objections can reasonably be raised against this proposed International Air-Force. There is, so far as I can see, only one ground of serious objection to the institution of it. It will be objected that the existence of such a Super-Force might be a danger to the world in two ways: first, it might be used unjustly to the detriment of unoffending nations; secondly, it might get out of hand, go on the rampage as a pirate power, and hold the world to ransom.

The former objection is one that holds equally against all police power. But the danger of such abuse of power would be far less in the case of an international police-force which can only act in the full light of day with the eyes of the whole world upon it, than in the case of domestic police power against whose arbitrary action the individual citizen may find it difficult to find absolute security or redress. Yet no serious person regards domestic police power as other than an unfortunate necessity of all civilized existence. As was said in a former chapter, all liberty and all justice depend upon such power, even though it be latent only, held in reserve for occasions which may never arise.

The second objection is purely fanciful. A great international army might be,

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would be, a danger to the world as well as a considerable economic burden. But an international air-force, with its comparatively small personnel and its intimate and complete dependence upon its bases of supply, could never be tempted to undertake piratical adventures or be used by a new Napoleon for his own sinister purposes. It could occupy no territory and could not maintain its efficiency for the briefest period without civilian co-operation.

The international composition of the personnel, the small number of men of any one nation serving in such a police-force, and its distribution in a number of widely separated depots would be further guarantees against its getting out of hand.

The application of such International Police-Force would not be open to the very serious objection which lies against every proposal for the use of international armies and navies for police purposes, namely, that such usage would be an attempt to abolish war by making more war, by extending the area of warfare. As I have already pointed out, we might well hope that the existence of such Police-Power under the direction of a trusted International Court of Justice would suffice to prevent war without the exercise of physical force. But, even if it should become necessary to put into

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action the latent force commanded by the Court, its operation would not involve peaceful nations in war, would not extend the area of warfare. And in order to render its application effective with a minimum of destructive violence, it might be applied in a graded series of operations of increasing intensity, beginning with a mere demonstration in force, going on to the dropping of a few bombs on military depots, then to destruction of Government buildings, and as a last resort, never likely to be provoked, the destruction of a capital city.

One other objection is conceivable. There are persons who will say—The existence of such a force may hurt the feelings and provoke the resentment of nations outside the League, and therefore it must not be contemplated. To this the obvious and sufficient answer is that membership in the League is open to all nations. Any nation that may wish to enjoy the benefits of membership will be welcomed. And, as for those nations that may choose to remain outside it, the League's Police-Force will in no wise interfere with them, will in no way restrict their liberty of action, so long as they abstain from unprovoked attack upon members of the League. Surely the members of the League have the right to say to other nations—We refuse to continue to bear the burden of great

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national armaments and constantly to risk incurring the horrors of war, in order that you may enjoy unrestricted licence of aggression against us.

IS IT PRACTICABLE ?

That such a force could readily be organized and maintained is a proposition beyond dispute. It could be constituted in a very brief time and at small expense by selection from among the air-forces at present maintained by the nations of the League. And, if in the judgment of experts such a course seemed desirable, it could easily be maintained at a two-power, or three-power, standard. It might, however, reasonably be expected that the benefits offered by a League of Nations, thus provided with effective International Law, would be so obvious, and the drawbacks attending exclusion from it so serious, that after a short time no powerful nation would remain outside it. Then a comparatively small air-force would suffice for all international police purposes, a force so small that the burden of its upkeep would be vanishingly small.

IS IT LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE ?

Would the existence of such an International Police-Force under the direction of the International Court of Justice be

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able to give effective protection against aggression? Would it allay for the member nations of the League all fear of unprovoked aggression? The answer can hardly be in doubt. The veto of the Court, backed by the threat of action from the air against the capital of any nation, or, if necessary, by a demonstration in force, would be sufficient to arrest all aggressive military action, and to bring to its senses any irate nation.

For the threat could be put into execution almost instantaneously and overwhelmingly. In these days of wireless communication, the whole, or a very large part, of the International Police Force could be concentrated at any spot within a very brief time.

As regards action against any member nation of the League, it would probably be necessary to exempt from such duty all squadrons manned by members of that nation; but that necessity would not seriously diminish the available force.

Only a complete rupture of the League by the division of its members into conflicting groups could render ineffective the International Force by depriving it of authoritative direction. And nations enjoying the solid benefits of sure protection would be far less likely than they are at present to lend themselves to any such division into conflicting groups.

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How far it might be possible for any nation to put up any effective resistance to the International Air-Force is a matter for experts to decide. But it seems obvious that such resistance would be impossible for any member nation of the League, unless it had prepared in secret a very considerable air-force, provided with fighting planes of the most effective type and manned by pilots trained in the practices of aerial warfare. And to the layman it seems impossible that such preparations should be made in secret. It might be judged desirable to ask of the nations of the League that they should forego the luxury of possessing anti-aircraft guns; though in view of the ineffectiveness of guns against aircraft, that would hardly seem necessary.

In no other way would it be necessary to interfere with the independence of the nations. They might maintain armies and fleets as large as they desired, and enforce conscription on all their citizens. But it seems safe to prophesy that the sure protection afforded by the International Air-Force would soon make large armies and fleets old-fashioned and foolish luxuries; for the fear of aggression would have become but as the memory of a nightmare that cannot recur.

I venture, then, to assert that only

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anarchists, philosophical or unphilosophical, or persons who, without knowing it, take up the anarchical position, will object to the institution of such International Police-Force as is here proposed. And fortunately such persons are relatively few.

The nations of the League might be content to have provided protection against unjustified aggression, and thus to have diminished immeasurably the danger of future wars. This great primary purpose of International Justice having been attained by the institution of International Police-Power, it would be a matter for discussion whether the League should go further in developing effective International Law. It would be at this stage of the development of true Internationalism that those who dread the creation of a Super-State might properly intervene in the discussion and take up the defence of the rights and independence of nations. I, for one, would urge that we do not need, and should jealously guard against all tendencies of the League to assume, the function of international legislation. The decisions of the International Court of Justice would build up a body of precedents that would in course of time constitute a body of accepted and effective International Law. These decisions would be the result of the

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application to particular cases by the highest judicial minds of the universally accepted principles of justice. They would be very different from statutes passed by a majority vote of an international parliament subject to all the chances of party manipulation, and to the perversions proceeding from national animus and jealousies and all the turbid emotions of a great talking-shop.

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